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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims and Challenges 
Digital technologies and the Internet may pose risks for the safety and well-being of children. 
The Internet in particular has created new opportunities for child sexual offenders to find and 
contact victims, and to sexually exploit them. Sexual predators are active in self-created 
Internet communities, where they exchange tips and tactics on how to most effectively 
approach and manipulate children.1 Perpetrators also use social media platforms and chatrooms 
to directly engage with victims. This constantly evolving model of sexual exploitation of 
children is characterised by the exchange of messages with victims via the Internet that 
typically escalate quickly to sexually-explicit conversations. Once contact has been 
established, the victim is usually asked or even pressured to undress in front of a webcam, to 
perform or witness sexual acts, or all of the above. An additional dimension to this problem is 
the fact that parents or legal guardians may directly be involved in the sexual exploitation of 
their children. The latter is especially true for families living in developing countries, who 
prostitute their children as a much needed source of income.  
 
The situation whereby children are engaged in webcam prostitution is generally referred to as 
webcam child sex tourism. Webcam sex tourism not only causes serious and lasting damage to 
children2, it also challenges the effectiveness of criminal investigations, as live webcam 
performances leave few traces and little evidence that law enforcement can use. Further 
difficulties arise from the fact that webcam sex tourism often has a trans-border character, 
which causes jurisdictional conflicts and makes it more difficult to obtain evidence or even 
launch an investigation. 
 
The Dutch children’s rights organization Terre des Hommes (‘TdH’) was the first NGO to 
combat webcam child sex tourism by using a virtual character called ‘Sweetie’. Sweetie was 
used to identify offenders in chatrooms and online forums. The Sweetie avatar, posing as a ten-
year old Filipino girl, was operated by an agent of the organisation, whose goal was to gather 
information on individuals who contacted Sweetie and solicited webcam sex. The gathered 
information was subsequently handed over to the authorities, who thereupon launched 
investigations in various countries.3  
 
The successful implementation of Sweetie 1.0 inspired the further technological development 
of Sweetie. This time, a technical team commissioned by TdH is engineering an artificial 
intelligence (‘AI’) software system, capable of depicting and acting as Sweetie without human 
intervention in order to not only identify persistent perpetrators, but also to deter first-time 
offenders.4  
                                                
1 Lovejoy, TP 2007, ‘New Playground: Sexual Predators and Pedophiles Online: Criminalizing Cyber Sex 
between Adults and Minors’, p. 312.  
2 Goldstein, RD 1999, Child abuse and neglect: Cases and materials, listing the harms to children of premature 
sexual exposure at p. 144.   
3 Further information on the project known as ‘Sweetie 1.0’ can be found on www.terredeshommes.nl/en/sweetie-
face-webcam-child-sex-tourism. [16 June 2016].  
4 For further information on the second part of the project known as ‘Sweetie 2.0’ see 
https://www.terredeshommes.nl/programmas/sweetie-20-webcamseks-met-kinderen-de-wereld-uit. [16 June 
2016].  
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However, the creation of the software raises various challenging legal questions on its 
application in a law enforcement context. The laws that govern the use of special investigative 
tools and the role of law enforcement need to be considered. It is precisely this background 
against which the central question of this legal study takes shape. This report aims to illuminate 
the existing legal framework of criminal laws and procedures in a number of selected countries 
in order to determine whether said framework allows for investigative methods such as Sweetie 
to be used by law enforcement agencies in the fight against webcam child sex tourism. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
In this report we address the following problem statement: 
  
To what extent is it possible for law enforcement agencies to use Sweetie 2.0 for the 
investigation and prosecution of webcam sex with minors based on the current criminal law 
framework (in a selected number of countries)? 
 
The answer to this problem statement may yield the conclusion that the (inter)national criminal 
law framework may currently not be adequate to combat webcam sex using tools like Sweetie. 
Therefore, we will also consider the following question: 
 
Which changes to the (inter)national criminal law framework are necessary/desirable in order 
to facilitate the effective and legitimate use of Sweetie by law enforcement agencies? 
 
To solve this twofold problem statement, we will explore the following research questions: 
 
1.) How is webcam sex with minors criminalised in selected jurisdictions? 
 
2.) To what extent do existing crime descriptions within substantive criminal law apply to 
virtual victims (i.e., chatbots like Sweetie 2.0)? 
 
3.) To what extent does the criminal procedure law framework allow for the (proactive) 
investigation of webcam sex offences using Sweetie 2.0, taking into account that:   
1. Sweetie 2.0 is an AI that interacts with suspects without direct human control or 
intervention; 
2. A 'fake identity' is used for the AI. 
 
4.) Are there specific limitations in criminal procedure when it comes to entrapment and 
what are the consequences of this for using Sweetie 2.0? 
 
5.) Which forensic requirements apply to the collection of evidence using Sweetie 2.0? 
 
Given the global nature of the issue of webcam sex tourism, we will also discuss issues 
surrounding international investigations and jurisdiction. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
In this report Sweetie’s use will be assessed in the light of the five main legal issues it raises.  
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In the area of substantive criminal law, these include the application of criminal provisions to 
virtual victims such as Sweetie, and the criminalisation of preparatory acts and attempts to 
commit the sexual offences in question. In this context, particular attention will be given to the 
doctrine of impossible attempts.   
 
In terms of procedural criminal law aspects, we seek to establish whether existing coercive 
powers can provide a legal basis for the use of Sweetie 2.0. Special investigative powers are 
usually employed without the suspect’s knowledge or consent, which interferes with his/her 
right to privacy and private life as stipulated in Art. 8 ECHR5 and Art. 17 ICCPR6. In addition, 
the right to a fair trial as codified in Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 14 ICCPR has to be taken into 
account when assessing the (proactive) use of artificial intelligence agents in criminal 
investigations and the thereby triggering defence of entrapment. 
 
We will use the following research methodologies to analyse the use of Sweetie 
 
1.3.1 Desk research and literature study 
The basis of the research is desk research and literature study. 
 
1.3.2 Comparative legal analysis 
After introducing the international instruments that are relevant for this study, the report 
continues with the comparative legal analysis. The main goal of the comparative legal analysis 
is to compare and contrast the legal approaches to dealing with the issue of webcam child sex 
tourism and the application of Sweetie 2.0. Furthermore, the comparative legal analysis will 
highlight any issues when it comes to jurisdictional issues related to criminalisation and cross-
border investigation. 
 
Given that webcam sex tourism is a global phenomenon a diverse set of countries (in terms of 
geographical location and legal systems) was chosen for analysis. The following countries were 
selected for analysis:  
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada  
Croatia 
England and Wales 
Estonia 
Germany7 
                                                
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS no. 194, Rome, 4.XI.1950 
(ECHR).   
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNT 171 (ICCPR). 
7 The information used to assess the German situation reflects on substantive criminal law issues only. Therefore, 
Germany is not considered in the analysis of criminal procedure.  
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Israel 
Netherlands 
Nigeria 
Philippines 
Poland 
Scotland8 
South Korea 
Spain 
Turkey 
United States 
 
Selection criteria were: geographic spread, type of legal system, exposure to webcam sex 
tourism and prior experience with Sweetie 1.0.9 Practitioners and scholars from the selected 
jurisdictions were asked to prepare a comprehensive report on their respective criminal system 
and to evaluate it against the research question(s) of the Sweetie project. The authors of the 
country reports are acknowledged throughout the present study.   
 
1.4 Structure of the report 
This study is divided into eight chapters, including the present introduction. The report 
continues with chapter two, which presents Sweetie, the software behind the avatar, its goals 
and application. Chapter three discusses the core legal issues raised by Sweetie in terms of 
substantive criminal law by establishing a baseline of the international law provisions 
applicable to the matter, and subsequently turns to a comparative analysis of the legal norms 
that cover webcam child sex tourism in the studied countries. Chapter four does the same with 
regard to procedural criminal law. Chapter five touches upon the standards of digital forensics 
relevant for the preservation of data and evidence originating from the cyber domain. Chapter 
six elaborates on the jurisdictional issues concerning trans-border investigations of webcam 
sexual assaults of children. An analysis of the restrictions found in the discussed criminal law 
systems and suggestions on how to adapt the legal frameworks to the challenge of webcam 
child sex tourism can be found in chapter seven. Chapter eight offers a summary and conclusion 
of our findings.  
 
2 Sweetie 
 
As a result of the rapid proliferation of devices with cameras, free video chat software (e.g. 
Skype and Google Hangout), the increase in Internet bandwidth, and the lowering cost of data 
traffic, people throughout the world now communicate on a daily basis via video. A specific 
aspect of video chatting is that of a sexual nature: webcam sex. 
 
While webcam sex can take place legally between consenting adults, there are also risks 
associated with webcam sex, in particular for minors. Risks arise not only because predators 
                                                
8 Scotland is officially a part of the United Kingdom, as are England and Wales. However, given the different 
criminal law system vis-a-vis the rest of the UK, it is listed as a separate country. 
9 Some relevant countries (such as for instance Russia or Kenia) did not make the final selection due to the 
unavailability of a legal expert in the timeframe of the project. 
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actively approach unsuspecting minors, but also because a ‘cottage industry’ of webcam 
prostitution of minors has emerged, in particular in developing countries. This relatively new 
phenomenon of webcam child sex tourism has quickly grown into a hidden, but global problem. 
  
To combat webcam sex tourism and raise awareness for the issue, Terre des Hommes 
developed the Sweetie programme. Sweetie 1.0 was a virtual 10–year old Filipino girl used to 
identify and expose pedosexuals engaged in webcam sex tourism. Sweetie was operated by a 
human agent that engaged in conversation with the suspected webcam sex tourist. 
 
While Sweetie 1.0 was extremely successful, one limitation of its design was the human 
operator. A human operator can only conduct a number of chat conversation at the same time, 
while real victims receive up to two hundred sex solicitations an hour. To counter this problem 
TdH has developed a more advanced version of Sweetie: Sweetie 2.0. The main difference 
with Sweetie 1.0 is that Sweetie 2.0 is no longer operated by a human, but is a now a fully 
autonomous artificial intelligence that can engage in a meaningful conversation with a 
suspect.10 Unlike human operators, the use of this artificial intelligence is in theory infinitely 
scalable. 
 
2.1 Technology 
Sweetie is a virtual minor that engages in conversation with a suspect who has a sexual interest 
in children with the goal of identifying this suspect. Sweetie is comprised of three main 
technological elements: 1) three dimensional imagery, 2) a chatbot facility, and 3) an 
underlying software framework.11 
 
2.1.1 3D imagery 
The most striking aspect of the original Sweetie was the use of 3D imagery to create a realistic 
representation of a virtual girl. The realistic animations of Sweetie were designed to make 
suspects think that they were dealing with a real minor. For Sweetie 2.0 the animations have 
been further refined. It is important to note that Sweetie’s animations do not show any nudity 
or images of a sexual nature.  
 
2.1.2 Chatbot facility 
To eliminate the need for human intervention, Sweetie 2.0 employs AI technology. A chatbot 
character has been built based on the experiences, work instructions and chat logs from the 
initial Sweetie project. Using results from the past, the conversation model will simulate as 
realistically as possible a fictitious 10/11-year-old child. 
 
2.1.3 Software Framework  
To use the chatbot functionality for various communication platforms a base has been built that 
interconnects all software components. These components include, but are not limited to: 
 
• Automated chat functionality for the chatrooms and direct chat; 
• Functions to drive the generated imagery; 
                                                
10 This type of artificial intelligence is popularly known as a ‘chatbot’. 
11 https://tracksinspector.com/blog/ti-software-sweetie-2-0.html. [28 September 2016].  
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• Management functionality for the chatrooms, characters, chat structure and 
corresponding question/ answer combinations; 
• Storage of all chats and related details; 
• Processing of identifiable material from the chats for each chat partner; 
• Detection functionality to recognize repeating chat partners, indecent 
proposals/ or explicit materials; 
• Dashboard for graphical presentation of all required actions, chat results, as 
well as statistics for operational, tactical and strategic insight; 
• Reporting module to confront potentially offending chat partners with their 
own behaviour and chat phrases. This module will also follow up with 
relevant advice, deterrent warnings and/ or possible threat of identification, 
based on the findings of current academic research for the project. 
 
The chat logs are stored and exchanged data are processed per chat to a profile for each chat 
partner. This profile can ultimately be used to identify repetitive patterns. All chat reports and 
extracts of chats are logged in a universally accepted standard which facilitates the exchange 
of cases. This will take into account generic storage methods used by various national and 
international (investigation) agencies such as Interpol and Europol in order to simplify 
matching with other (online) child abuse cases. 
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3 Substantive criminal law 
 
Sweetie is an investigative tool that enables law enforcement to engage with sexual predators 
and interact with them. If law enforcement is to use Sweetie as an investigative method, this 
means that the actual behaviour under investigation (i.e., interacting with Sweetie) must be 
deemed criminal behaviour. If this is not the case, then it will be much harder, if not impossible 
to prove that the suspect committed or attempted a criminal act. This in turn will make it more 
difficult to justify the use of Sweetie as an investigative method.  
 
In this chapter we explore whether and how (an attempt) to interact with Sweetie in a sexually 
oriented way is criminalised in the various jurisdictions under investigation. To this end we 
first consult the international law instruments to establish a ‘baseline’ of criminal behaviour 
and then explore specific substantive law issues in relation to webcam sex in general and 
webcam sex with an avatar such as Sweetie in particular.  
 
3.1 Criminalisation of abuse of minors and international harmonisation 
In most, if not all jurisdictions worldwide, sexual abuse of minors is criminalised. Different 
forms of abuse are criminalised in national criminal law. Apart from criminalisation at the 
national level, there is also international harmonisation when it comes to the protection of 
minors and the criminalisation of abuse of minors. 
 
At a global level the protection of minors is codified in different international law instruments. 
For the purpose of this report we will explore four particularly relevant international law 
instruments: 1) the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),12 and 2) the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution 
and child pornography (OPSC),13 3) the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of 
Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Convention)14 and, 4) the 
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention.15,16 
 
3.1.1 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is an international treaty that 
sets out the civil, political, economic, social, health and cultural rights of children. At the 
                                                
12 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3 (CRC or UNCRC), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. [13 June 
2016].  
13 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography (adopted on 25 May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002) A/RES/54/263, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPSCCRC.aspx. [13 June 2016].  
14 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 
CETS 201, Lanzarote, 25.X.2007 (Lanzarote Convention).  
15 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, CETS No.185, Budapest, 23.XI.2001 (Budapest Convention), 
available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_e
n.pdf. [13 June 2016].  
16 Both the Lanzarote Convention and the Cybercrime Convention are Council of Europe instruments. In the 
European Union Directive 2011/93/EU on combating sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, and child 
pornography is also applicable. Given the more global remit of the Council of Europe instruments, we will not 
discuss Directive 2011/93/EU further in the context of this report. 
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moment of writing there are 196 countries party to the treaty.17 The United States is the only 
member of the UN that has not ratified the document. 
 
The fundamental idea of the CRC is that every child, every human being below the age of 
eighteen years, is born with fundamental freedoms and the inherent rights of human beings. 
Moreover, the CRC recalls that children are entitled to special care and assistance because of 
their vulnerability.18 According to the preamble children need to grow up ‘in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.’19 Article 20 of the CRC, 
for example, states that a child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the state. 
Furthermore, General Comment 13 to the CRC underlines the importance that every child’s 
life must be free from all forms of violence.20 
 
While the CRC does not criminalise specific acts against the well-being of children, several 
articles put a positive obligation on the states to protect children against sexual abuse and 
exploitation. Article 19 and Article 34 are particularly relevant in this regard: 
Article 19 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or 
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) 
or any other person who has the care of the child. 
Article 34 
States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all 
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:  
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 
 
3.1.2 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography (OPSC) has been signed by 182 state parties to this 
date, yet no more than 173 have ratified it.21 The protocol is intended to achieve the purposes 
of the articles in the CRC. For example, Article 1 states that parties are to protect the rights and 
interests of child victims of trafficking, child prostitution, child pornography and child labour. 
                                                
17 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en. [18 May 
2016].  
18 UNCRC, Preamble, paras 4 and 9. 
19 UNCRC, Preamble, para 6.  
20 Committee on the Rights of the Child 2011, General comment No. 13: The right of the child to freedom from 
all forms of violence, CRC/C/GC/13. 
21 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en. [18 May 
2016]. 
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Article 2 (broadly) defines the criminal acts of sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography: 
 
For the purposes of the present Protocol: 
 
(a) Sale of children means any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by 
any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other 
consideration; 
 
(b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration 
or any other form of consideration; 
 
(c) Child pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child 
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the 
sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes. 
 
The OPSC obliges states to criminalise these practices. Finally, the protocol sets international 
standards for mutual assistance in investigations, confiscation of assets and extradition. 
 
3.1.3 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Convention) 
The Lanzarote Convention is a Council of Europe Convention aimed at combating sexual 
exploitation and abuse of minors. The purposes of the Lanzarote Convention are defined in 
Article 1: 
 
• Prevent and combat sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children; 
• Protect the rights of child victims of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse; 
• Promote national and international co-operation against sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse of children.  
 
The treaty obliges parties to pass laws that criminalise any practice that is in conflict with these 
purposes, for instance child pornography. All Member States of the Council have ratified the 
treaty. 
 
We will use the Lanzarote Convention as a basis for our discussion of substantive criminal law 
as it provides the most complete inventory of crimes related to minors. 
 
3.1.4 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
Being the first in its kind, the Convention on Cybercrime pursues a common criminal policy 
aimed at the protection of society against crimes committed via the Internet and other computer 
networks.22 The treaty fosters fast and effective international cooperation, harmonisation of 
domestic criminal law in the area of cybercrime and the provision of domestic criminal 
procedural law powers necessary for the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. The 
                                                
22 Convention on Cybercrime, Preamble, para 8.  
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Convention contains provisions on a wide variety of crimes, such as violations of network 
security, computer related fraud and child pornography.  
 
Thus far, 49 states have ratified the Cybercrime Convention.23 Parties to the treaty are not only 
Member States of the Council of Europe. The treaty is also ratified by Australia, Canada, The 
Dominican Republic, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, Sri Lanka and the United States. 
Relevant for the purpose of this study is that the Cybercrime convention criminalises offences 
related to child pornography (Article 9).  
 
3.1.5 International harmonisation in the area of abuse of minors 
The table below specifies which of the countries under investigation in this study have signed 
and ratified the international law instruments described above.  
 
Table 1: International harmonisation in the area of abuse of minors 
 UN Convention on 
the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) 
Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on 
the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of 
children, child 
prostitution and child 
pornography (OPSC) 
Council of Europe 
Convention on the 
Protection of 
Children against 
Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual Abuse 
(Lanzarote 
Convention) 
Council of 
Europe 
Cybercrime 
Convention 
Argentina X X - - 
Australia X X - X 
Belgium X X X X 
Brazil X X - - 
Canada  X X - X 
Croatia X24 X X X 
England and Wales X X S (Signed, not 
ratified) 
X 
Estonia X X S  X 
Germany X X X X 
Israel X X - X 
Netherlands X X X X 
Nigeria X X - - 
Philippines X X - - 
Poland X X X X 
Scotland          X (UK)          X (UK) S (UK)         X (UK) 
South Korea X X - - 
Spain X X X X 
Turkey X X X X 
United States S  X - X 
                                                
23 http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/201/signatures. [18 May 2016]. 
24 Signed by Yugoslavia, ratified by Croatia.  
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3.2 Criminalisation of webcam sex with minors 
This section reviews the criminal law offences potentially applicable to sexual abuse of minors 
via webcam. It does so by summarising the provisions focusing on the key types of behaviour 
regularly occurring in webcam abuse. It then turns to evaluate whether and how said provisions 
apply to virtual minors such as Sweetie. 
 
3.2.1 International harmonisation 
What we can deduct from table 1 is that while all countries under investigation in this study 
have signed and ratified the CRC and the OPSC, not all countries have signed the Lanzarote 
Convention, which provides the most complete inventory of criminal offences related to the 
abuse of minors. This may pose a problem when it comes to the international harmonisation of 
the criminalisation of webcam sex, given that the OPSC does not specifically define or 
criminalise certain types of child exploitation such as webcam sex and grooming.  
 
Criminal behaviour aimed at minors that does not qualify as prostitution or as child 
pornography is, for instance, not covered by the OPSC. This means that crimes such as webcam 
sex, grooming and the corruption of children are not fully harmonised throughout the 
jurisdictions under examination.  
 
Furthermore, it may also mean that webcam sex, grooming and the corruption of children are 
not criminalised at the national level. Though when it comes to the topic of this research 
(webcam sex with minors) we have not found any proof of this. All jurisdictions that did not 
sign the Lanzarote Convention have still criminalised webcam sex with minors in national law, 
in one way or another (see table 3).  
 
3.2.2 Relevant crime descriptions 
The international law instruments described above and the national criminal laws of the 
different countries contain a number of broadly formulated crime descriptions that may or may 
not cover webcam sex with minors. 
 
Depending on the exact form and circumstances of the act, the offences listed below may come 
into view when a person is interacting with a minor though a webcam for the purpose of sexual 
gratification. For the sake of good order we use the articles from the Lanzarote Convention as 
a framework for discussion. The relevant articles are: 
 
- Article 18. Sexual abuse 
- Article 19. Offences concerning child prostitution 
- Article 20. Offences concerning child pornography 
- Article 21. Offences concerning the participation of a child in pornographic 
performances 
- Article 22. Corruption of children 
- Article 23. Online solicitation of children for sexual purposes 
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3.2.2.1 Sexual abuse 
Sexual abuse may cover a range of sexual activities that take place between the perpetrator and 
the minor, such as rape, assault and the commission of lewd/lascivious acts. Article 18 of the 
Lanzarote Convention defines sexual abuse as: 
 
a. engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant 
provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities;  
b. engaging in sexual activities with a child where: – use is made of coercion, force 
or threats; or – abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or 
influence over the child, including within the family; or – abuse is made of a 
particularly vulnerable situation of the child, notably because of a mental or 
physical disability or a situation of dependence.  
 
 
Paragraph 1a criminalises engaging in sexual activities with a person who has not reached the 
age at which it is allowed to engage in sexual activities with him or her. This age is established 
in domestic law: 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 above, each Party shall decide the age below 
which it is prohibited to engage in sexual activities with a child. 
 
Paragraph 1b criminalises engaging in sexual activities with a child where use is made of 
coercion, force or threats, or when this person abuses a recognised position of trust, authority 
or influence. 
 
All of the countries under investigation have provisions in their domestic law that criminalise 
sexual abuse of minors. In the Lanzarote Convention the term ‘sexual activities’ has not been 
further defined. The negotiators preferred to leave it to the States to further define the meaning 
and scope of the term.25 In the domestic law of the countries under investigation, ‘sexual 
activities’ generally cover acts whereby there is direct physical contact (including by force, 
under threat or through other forms of coercion) between the perpetrator and the victim, such 
as rape and assault. A position of trust, authority or influence over the minor is an aggravating 
circumstance, which generally carries higher penalties.  
 
3.2.2.2 Offences concerning child prostitution 
Child prostitution covers a number of criminal acts whereby a minor is used for sexual activities 
in exchange for some form of remuneration. Article 2 paragraph b of the OPSC defines child 
prostitution as: 
 
(…) the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any other form of 
consideration. 
 
Article 19 paragraph 2 of the Lanzarote Convention defines child prostitution as: 
                                                
25 Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. CETS 201, para 127. 
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(…) the fact of using a child for sexual activities where money or any other form of 
remuneration or consideration is given or promised as payment, regardless if this 
payment, promise or consideration is made to the child or to a third person. 
 
Offences concerning child prostitution  
1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that 
the following intentional conduct is criminalised:  
a. recruiting a child into prostitution or causing a child to participate in 
prostitution;  
b. coercing a child into prostitution or profiting from or otherwise exploiting a child 
for such purposes;  
c. having recourse to child prostitution.  
 
Criminal liability is extended to both the person(s) prostituting the minor and the customer(s). 
In relation to the topic of this research, this article is of particular importance. In most cases of 
webcam sex with minors, a minor from a developing country is forced or coerced by a third 
party (parents, criminals) to participate in a webcam session with a perpetrator (the ‘webcam 
sex tourist’). This webcam sex tourist generally wants to watch (and indirectly participate in) 
a pornographic performance involving a minor in exchange for money. 
 
Given the broad definition of ‘sexual activities’ there are no a priori limitations to applying this 
article in the context of webcam sex tourism.  
 
3.2.2.3 Offences concerning child pornography 
Offences concerning child pornography are also highly relevant in the context of webcam sex 
with minors and webcam sex tourism, given that the images streamed and captured via the 
webcam will generally qualify as child pornography. 
 
Child pornography is criminalised in the OPSC, the Lanzarote Convention and the Cybercrime 
Convention. 
 
The OPSC uses the following definition of child pornography: 
 
Child pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child 
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the 
sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes. 
 
In the Lanzarote Convention child pornography is defined as: 
 
(…) any material that visually depicts a child engaged in real or simulated sexually 
explicit conduct or any depiction of a child’s sexual organs for primarily sexual 
purposes. 
 
Finally, according to the Cybercrime Convention: 
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the term ‘child pornography’ shall include pornographic material that visually 
depicts: 
a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; 
b) a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; 
c) realistic images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 
 
In the international law instruments at hand both the production and consumption of child 
pornography is criminalised. The Lanzarote Convention lists the following acts as criminal:  
 
a. producing child pornography; 
b. offering or making available child pornography; 
c. distributing or transmitting child pornography; 
d. procuring child pornography for oneself or for another person; 
e. possessing child pornography; 
f. knowingly obtaining access, through information and communication 
technologies, to child pornography. 
 
When it comes to illegal webcam sex, sub c and f are of particular interest. Before the advent 
of webcam sex, most of the child pornography was either distributed by means of physical 
carriers (photos, magazines) or obtained digitally and subsequently stored on local media such 
as hard drives and DVDs. In these cases procurement and possession of child pornography 
could be proven more easily. With webcam sex, however, by default there is no local storage 
of the streamed data, unless the offender records the stream or takes screenshots. The 
ephemeral nature of this type of child pornography consumption means that procurement and 
possession is difficult, if not impossible to prove. Therefore, article f criminalises the access to 
child pornography in itself. As such, webcam sex with minors may also fall under the heading 
of (attempting) to access child pornography.26 On the 'production side' making a webcam sex 
stream available may fall under the heading of sub c (transmitting child pornography).27 
 
Virtual child pornography 
Apart from actual child pornography, many countries also criminalise the production, sale, 
possession of and access to ‘virtual’ child pornography. Virtual child pornography refers to 
images whereby it realistically appears that a minor is engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 
This is particularly relevant for Sweetie, which is a virtual minor that may appear to be engaged 
in sexually explicit behaviour. 
 
Both the OPSC and Lanzarote Convention use broad definitions of child pornography that may 
also include images of virtual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct or the computer-
generated depiction of a child’s sexual organs for primarily sexual purposes. After all, they see 
to ‘any representation’ or ‘any material that visually depicts’, which may include computer-
                                                
26 Please note that paragraph 4 of Article 2 OSPC gives countries the possibility to not apply paragraph 1f in 
national law. 
27 In Canada for instance, subs. 163.1 (4.2) of the Canadian Criminal Code criminalises the viewing of webcam 
performances by attaching liability to those who knowingly access child pornography by knowingly causing child 
pornography to be viewed by or transmitted to himself or herself. Following the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court, Art. 383bis § 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code also penalises knowingly and without a right accessing child 
pornographic images through information and communication technologies.  
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generated representations. However, while the Lanzarote Convention clearly intends to include 
it within the definition’s scope (see Art. 20 paragraph 3), for the OPSC this is not evident. One 
could also argue, therefore, that virtual child pornography is not explicitly referred to, it is not 
included in the OSPC definition..  
 
The Cybercrime Convention, in contrast, does use an explicit reference to virtual child 
pornography, as long as the images are realistic: 
 
‘… the term ‘child pornography’ shall include pornographic material that visually 
depicts:  
(…) 
c) realistic images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.’ 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Cybercrime Convention virtual child pornography is 
further described as: 
 
‘images, which, although ‘realistic’, do not in fact involve a real child engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct. This latter scenario includes pictures which are altered, 
such as morphed images of natural persons, or even generated entirely by the 
computer.’28 
 
Under both the Lanzarote Convention and the Cybercrime Convention it is optional to 
criminalise virtual child pornography (see Article 20 paragraph 3 and Article 9 paragraph 4 
respectively).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, para 101. 
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Table 2: Criminalisation of (virtual) child pornography 
 Child pornography Virtual child pornography 
Argentina X -  
Australia X X29 
Belgium X X 
Brazil X -30 
Canada  X X31 
Croatia X X 
England and 
Wales 
X +/-32 
Estonia X X 
Germany X X33 
Israel X -  
Netherlands X X 
Nigeria X X 
Philippines X X 
Poland X +/-34 
Scotland X +/-35 
South Korea X - 
Spain X X36 
Turkey X X 
United States X X 
 
 
3.2.2.4 Offences concerning the participation of a child in pornographic performances 
Article 21 of the Lanzarote Convention criminalises pornographic performances with minors: 
 
                                                
29 McEwewn v Simmons & Anor [2008] NSWSC 1292 at paras 38-39, confirming convictions for possession of 
virtual child pornography under both Commonwealth and State legislation. For more on the matter see Urbas, G, 
Substantive and procedural legislation in Australia to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (Australian 
report), p. 19.  
30 Article 241-E of the ECA refers to ‘real or simulated’ sexual activities. However the official interpretation of 
the provision is understood as implying the participation of real minors in the simulated activities and not of 
virtual victims.  
31 It appears that virtual child pornography, although not explicitly regulated, is criminalized as a matter of 
statutory interpretation of the definition given to the term, ‘child pornography’ at s. 163.1 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code.  
32 May fall under the heading of 'pseudo-photograph' of a child but if it does not, virtual images are also classed 
as child pornography under a different piece of legislation. They would be known as prohibited images of children 
(see country report on England and Wales). 
33 Virtual child pornography is covered by §184b (1) no. 2 and (3) StGB and covers realistic depictions of children 
that an average informed person could not tell apart from the depictions of real children.  
34 Child pornography is not further defined in Polish law. However, a broad interpretation of the term should be 
taken; see Skorvanek, I, Substantive and procedural legislation in Poland to combat webcam-related child sexual 
abuse (Polish report). 
35 May fall under the heading of 'pseudo-photograph', but not entirely clear (see Scotland country report). 
36 Article 189.1d) speaks of images that ‘appear to be of a child’ and of ‘realistic’ images. In general, based on 
the letter of the law, virtual child pornography is penalised too. 
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(...) a. recruiting a child into participating in pornographic performances or causing 
a child to participate in such performances;  
b. coercing a child into participating in pornographic performances or profiting 
from or otherwise exploiting a child for such purposes;  
c. knowingly attending pornographic performances involving the participation of 
children.  
 
Article 21 Paragraph 1 sub a and b focus on those organising the performance, whereas 
paragraph c focuses on the attendance of such performances.  
 
The OPSC does not specifically criminalise pornographic performances with a minor, but these 
might be covered by the broader notion of child prostitution: 
 
 (...) (b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in sexual activities for 
 remuneration or any other form of consideration; 
 
The Cybercrime Convention does not cover pornographic performances, although the 
recording of broadcasting of such a performance will be considered producing and distributing, 
offering, and/or transmitting child pornography. 
 
A webcam stream in which a minor performs sexual activities can be considered a 
pornographic performance. The question though is if attendance of such a performance at a 
distance is covered in the crime description. Whether this is the case is dependent on the 
domestic law of the countries under investigation. The Lanzarote Convention does specifically 
address this issue in the explanatory report, but leaves it to the contracting states to determine 
whether or not they wish to include webcam sex: 
 
Depending on States, this provision may also cover the situation of persons who are 
spectators of pornographic performances involving the participation of children through 
such means of communication as webcams.37  
 
3.2.2.5 Corruption of children 
The corruption of children is a specific offence criminalised in the Lanzarote Convention. The 
OPSC or the Cybercrime Convention do not cover it. Article 22 of the Lanzarote Convention 
criminalises: 
 
 (...) the intentional causing, for sexual purposes, of a child who has not reached the 
 age set in application of Article 18, paragraph 2, to witness sexual abuse or sexual 
 activities, even without having to participate. 
 
In the context of webcam sex this offence is relevant as it may cover those situations whereby: 
 
                                                
37 Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. 
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1) the perpetrator performs sexual activities in front of the webcam (e.g., masturbation).38 
 
2) the perpetrator tries to corrupt the minor, for instance by sending pictures of sexual activities 
to the minor or by promoting sexual activities using online chat functions. 
 
Given that it is possible to (video)chat with Sweetie, it is very well possible that these offences 
may also be committed by suspects alongside other offences. With Sweetie 1.0, suspects did 
indeed perform sexual activities in front of the webcam in ways that amounted to the corruption 
of children.  
 
Furthermore, in some criminal systems a sexually-charged chat with a (virtual) minor may be 
sufficient to meet the threshold of child corruption. This is the case, for instance, in Australia, 
where the suspect does not necessarily have to transmit imagery to the minor to bring about 
the corruption.39 The law speaks of ‘indecent communication’, whereas just the chat can meet 
this threshold provided that the communication language goes against the moral standards of 
ordinary people. In a similar vein, it appears that the Polish legislator has opted for a rather 
broad understanding of the term ‘pornography’, which would allow to see the indecent chat as 
pornographic material as well.  
 
3.2.2.6 Online solicitation of children for sexual purposes (grooming) 
Online solicitation of children for sexual purposes, more commonly referred to as 'grooming' 
is only criminalised in the Lanzarote Convention: 
 
Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to criminalise the 
intentional proposal, through information and communication technologies, of an 
adult to meet a child who has not reached the age set in application of Article 18, 
paragraph 2, for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in 
accordance with Article 18, paragraph 1.a, or Article 20, paragraph 1.a, against 
him or her, where this proposal has been followed by material acts leading to such a 
meeting. 
   
Grooming commonly takes place via either online chat or webcam, and as such it is related to 
the subject matter of our research. However, webcam child sex tourism focuses on having 
sexual contact through the webcam, not in physical proximity. As grooming is defined as 
proposing to meet (in real life), it is a form of real-life child sex tourism. Although perpetrators 
chatting with Sweetie may also propose a real-life meeting, this is not the primary focus of the 
types of cases we study. Having said that, Sweetie 2.0 may of course also be used in a national 
setting to lure groomers. 
 
3.3 Issues pertaining to the criminalisation of webcam sex with minors 
Having reviewed the different types of crime descriptions above we may conclude that at the 
international level there are different options for states to criminalise webcam sex (tourism) 
                                                
38 Exposing oneself in front of a minor and/or masturbating may also be criminalised in domestic law under the 
header of 'indecent exposure'. This is for instance the case in Argentina (Article 129 Argentinian Penal Code). 
39 See section 474.27A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).  
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with minors in national law. In table 3 below we summarise how each of the jurisdictions under 
examination have criminalised webcam sex tourism.  
 
While webcam sex has been criminalised in different ways throughout the countries presented 
in this report, some possibly complicating issues exist regarding the criminalisation per se or 
the harmonisation of criminalisation at the international level. Below we will briefly discuss 
these. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of a child/ minor 
When it comes to the criminalisation of webcam sex with minors (or any other form of sexual 
activity with minors for that matter), there is no full harmonisation on the age below which 
engaging in sexual activities with a person is deemed illegal. While on the supranational level 
there is general consensus as to the definition of a child (or minor), there is no full 
harmonisation on age in crime descriptions at the national level.40 
 
In the CRC, a child (minor) is defined in article 1 as: 
 
(…) a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. 
 
This definition applies to the Convention itself and to the OPSC.41  
 
Article 3(a) of the Lanzarote Convention defines a child (minor) as: 
 
 (...) any person under the age of 18 years. 
 
The negotiators of the Lanzarote Convention considered the possibility of harmonising 
criminal law in the area of child exploitation by establishing the age of sexual consent in the 
Convention, but it was ultimately decided to let the member States decide for themselves at 
what age sexual activities with a person are deemed legal. The main reason for this being that 
this age varies greatly in Member States of the Council of Europe because of cultural 
differences.42 
 
Nevertheless, for most jurisdictions under investigation in this report, a minor means a person 
below the age of 18 years and in most cases sexual activities involving such a minor are 
prohibited, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Some divergences can exist regarding the age of 
valid consent to sexual activities.   
 
When it comes to sexual activities involving Sweetie, it is also relevant to take into account 
that Sweetie depicts a person that is under the age of twelve. At this age, there will be no 
discussion in the jurisdictions under investigation that Sweetie is a minor and that any form of 
                                                
40 See also: Interagency Working Group on the Sexual Exploitation of Children 2016, Terminology guidelines for 
the protection of children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Luxembourg. 
41 The OPSC refers in the preamble to Article 1 of the CRC. 
42 Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. CETS 201. 
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sexual activity involving a 12-year old is prohibited. Moreover, for many countries engaging 
in sexual activities with a minor the age of Sweetie is an aggravating circumstance (e.g. 
Argentina, the USA, Spain and Canada). 
 
3.3.2 Relevance of physical presence 
Given that webcam sex is a relatively new phenomenon, substantive criminal laws in many 
countries have not been amended to specifically include webcam sex as an offence in itself. In 
most cases, existing crime descriptions cover webcam sex. Most of these descriptions however 
stem from a time when engaging in sexual activities with a minor required physical contact 
with the victim. This raises the question whether the physical element in the crime descriptions 
is of material importance, or whether these crime descriptions also cover sexual activities 
taking place via a webcam, without out any physical contact or physical presence. 
 
In several of the countries under investigation webcam sex with minors is considered sexual 
abuse. In the Netherlands, for instance, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that for sexual assault 
(article 247 of the Dutch Criminal Code) physical contact between the assailant and the victim 
is not necessary.43 This means that when the perpetrator is participating in a webcam session 
with a person under the age of 16 and the victim performs sexual acts (such as performing 
sexual acts with themselves or a third person), the perpetrator can be held accountable for 
sexual assault. In Canada, webcam sex may be considered sexual abuse if the perpetrator 
invites the victim to touch him or herself (Section 152 Canadian Criminal Code). Furthermore, 
physical presence is also not a requirement for the offence of indecent exposure. The court held 
that the element 'in any place' could also refer to the Internet.44 In Belgium, the adult who 
induces or forces a minor to display breasts or genitals or to perform sexual activities in front 
of the webcam is committing the offence of indecent assault (article 372 or 373 of the Belgian 
Criminal Code). In Turkey, however, physical contact is still considered an integral part of the 
offence of sexual abuse, which means that the sexual abuse of minors via the Internet could 
never fall within the scope of article 103 of the Turkish Criminal Code.45  
 
Apart from offences that fall into the category of sexual abuse, the Lanzarote convention also 
opens up the possibility to criminalise pornographic performances viewed via a webcam: 
 
‘Article 21 incriminates certain conducts relating to the participation of children in 
pornographic performances. Paragraph 1 a and b are elements relating to the 
organisation of pornographic performances involving children while c relates to the 
spectator. As with child prostitution and child pornography, the provision 
establishes links between the supply and the demand by attaching criminal liability 
to the organiser of such pornographic performances as well as the customer. 
Depending on States, this provision may also cover the situation of persons who are 
                                                
43 See: ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AQ0950.  
44 R v Alicandro [2009] ONCA 133 (CanLII).  
45 See Önok, M and Bayamlıoğlu, E, Substantive and procedural legislation in Turkey to combat webcam-related 
child sexual abuse (Turkey report), section 2.2.3, p. 16.  
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spectators of pornographic performances involving the participation of children 
through such means of communication as webcams.’46 
 
From the above we may conclude that while the element of physical presence does not 
necessarily preclude the application of existing crime descriptions such as those covering 
sexual abuse. However, this must be decided on a country-by-country basis. 
 
3.3.3 Substantive criminal law legality principle 
A third issue related to the criminalisation of webcam sex tourism is that of substantive criminal 
law legality (nulla poena sine lege). As described above, substantive criminal laws in many 
countries have not been amended to specifically include webcam sex as an offence in itself. 
Rather, webcam sex is 'read' into existing crime descriptions. As such, one could argue that the 
crime descriptions lack the requisite legal clarity and certainty (lex certa) to be applied to online 
contexts. Based on the examined case law for the different countries, we have no indication 
though that this is indeed the case. 
 
3.3.4 Differences in approach to the criminalisation of webcam sex 
Based on the criminal law systems of the countries under investigation, we may conclude that 
webcam sex with minors is generally considered criminal in one way or another. In most 
countries webcam sex with minors falls under the heading of offences related to child 
pornography. Depending on the country and the circumstances of the case, webcam sex with 
minors may also fall under different crime descriptions such as sexual abuse or child 
prostitution, offences that generally carry higher penalties. This is, however, very much 
dependent on the circumstances of the case and the specific jurisdiction. 
 
While there are differences in the approach to the criminalisation of webcam sex, they do not 
seem very problematic in the global fight against webcam child sex tourism. All of the 
jurisdictions examined have a more or less complete inventory of possible offences that apply 
in the context of webcam sex with minors.  
 
An issue that needs to be taken into account though is that of double criminality.47 Given the 
different approaches to the criminalisation of webcam sex, combating webcam sex tourism in 
an international context is more difficult. For instance, in the Netherlands webcam sex with a 
minor may qualify as 'sexual abuse', whereas in Turkey it only qualifies as 'sexual harassment' 
given that physical contact is necessary to proof sexual abuse. As such, law enforcement will 
need to assess whether the crime descriptions are sufficiently similar as not to cause issues of 
(a lack of) double criminality.  
 
                                                
46 Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. CETS 201.  
47 The principle of double criminality was introduced by extradition treaties and requires the act to which a request 
relates to be a crime under both the criminal law of the requested state and the requesting state. For a 
comprehensive discussion on this see Williams, SA 1991, ‘The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A 
Comparative Analysis’, Nova L. Rev., 15, p. 582. 
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The table below shows which criminal provisions potentially apply to webcam sex in the 
countries under investigation. The table fields marked in red indicate that the existing country 
legislation is not applicable in the context of webcam child sex tourism.48  
 
 
Table 3: Legislation applicable to webcam child sex tourism 
 18. Sexual 
abuse 
19. child 
prostitution 
20. child 
pornography 
21. 
pornographic 
performances 
22. 
corruption 
of children 
23. Online 
solicitation 
(grooming) 
Argentina   128 CC 128 CC 128 CC 131 CC 
Australia 272.11 
Criminal Code 
Act 1995 
(CCA) 
-49 474.19 CCA 
474.20 CCA 
 
272.14 CCA 272.9 CCA 
474.27 A 
272.15 CCA 
Belgium 372 Belgian 
Criminal Code 
(BCC) 
373, 375  BCC 
379, 380 BCC 
372, 373 and 
375 BCC 
383 bis BCC  
371/1 BCC 
379 BCC  
380 BCC 
385 BCC  
 
377quater BCC 
433bis/1 BCC 
Brazil 217-A 
Brazilian 
Criminal Code 
(CPB) 
241-D 
Children and 
Adolescent 
Statute (ECA)  
213 ECA 
218-B CPB 218-B CPB 217-A CPB  
241-D ECA  
241-E ECA 
218 CPB 218B CPB 
Canada 152 Canadian 
Criminal Code 
(CCC) 
286.1 (2) CCC.  
286.3 (2) CCC 
163.1 CCC 163.1 CCC 173 (2) CCC 170 CCC  
172.2 CCC  
172.1 CCC 
Croatia 158 Croatian 
Criminal Code 
(CrCC) 
(159 CrCC) 
162 CrCC 163 CrCC 164 CrCC  
165 CrCC 
160 (1) CrCC 161 CrCC 
England 
and Wales 
8, 10, 17, SOA 
2003  
47, 48, 50 SOA  7(7), Protection of 
Children Act 1978 
(?) 
12 SOA 2003 or 
OPA 1959 
12 SOA 14, 15 SOA  
Estonia  175 (1) EPC50 1751 EPC 1751 EPC 179 EPC 1781 EPC 
                                                
48 These provisions focus mostly on the actual physical contact between victim and offender, and are thus classical 
‘offline’ offences.  
49 The term 'child prostitution' and the corresponding offence is more explicitly regulated under State/ Territory 
laws. However, there is no case law applying this kind of offence to the online context, and the jurisdictional reach 
of such State/ Territorial laws is more limited. 
50 175(1) EPC refers to the ‘influencing of a person of less than eighteen years of age in order to cause him or her 
to commence or continue the commission of a criminal offence, begging, engagement in prostitution […]’. 
Usually, the provision would be an ‘offline’ offence. Yet, since it is possible that influencing is achieved through 
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178 EPC 178 EPC 
Germany 176 (4) no. 1 
StGB; 176 (4) 
no. 2 StGB 
176 (4) no. 2 
StGB 
176a (3) in 
conjunction with 
§184b StGB 
176 (4) no. 2 
StGB 
176 (4)  no. 4 
StGB 
176 (4) no. 3 
StGB 
Israel 345–351, 
203B Israeli 
Penal Code 
203B IPC 214B (3) IPC 214B (3) IPC 208 IPC 203B IPC 
Netherlands 247 Dutch 
Criminal Code 
(DCC) 
246 DCC  
248a DCC 
246b DCC 
248f DCC 
250 DCC 
240b DCC  240a DCC, 
248d DCC 
248e DCC 
Nigeria 32 (1) Child 
Rights Act 
(CRA) 
222A Nigerian 
Penal Code 
(NPC) 
 223 (2) NPC 
2234 (4) NPC 
281 NPC,  
30 (2) (e) CRA  
23 (1), (3) (c) 
Nigerian 
Cybercrimes Act 
(NCA) 
30 (2) CRA 23 (3) a NCA 23 (3) a NCA 
Philippines 2(h) Rules and 
Regulations on 
the Reporting 
and 
Investigation 
of Child 
Abuse Cases  
3 (h) Anti-
Trafficking in 
Persons Act of 
2003 (ATPA) 
3(a),(b).  Anti-
Child Pornography 
Act of 2009 
(ACPA) 
3(h), (j) ATPA  
4 (c) 2 Cybercrime 
Prevention Act of 
2012 (CPA)  
9 Special 
Protection of 
Children Against 
Abuse, 
Exploitation and 
Discrimination 
Act 
16-18 Revised 
Penal Code (RPC) 
340 RPC 3(h),(i) ACPA 
Poland 204(4) Polish 
Criminal Code 
(PCC) 
199 (3), 200 
(1), 203, 204 
PCC 
202 §3, 4, 4a, 4b, 
4c PCC 
Article 200a PCC Article 200 §3, 
4, 5 PCC 
Article 200a 
PCC 
Scotland -51 9 Protection of 
Children and 
Prevention of 
Sexual 
Offences Act 
2005 (PCPSO) 
- - 23, 24, 25, 33, 
34, 35 Section 
23 Sexual 
Offences Act 
2009 
1 PCPSO 
South 
Korea 
 Articles 12 (2), 
13 (2) of  the 
Act on the 
Protection of 
Juveniles 
Article 44-7(1)1 of  
the Act on 
Information 
Promotion  and 
Protection, and  
Communications 
Articles 287 and 
294 of CA 
Article 13 (2) 
of  the Act on 
Special Cases 
concerning the 
Punishment, 
ETC. of 
Articles 12 (2), 
13 (2) of  the 
Act on the 
Protection of 
Juveniles 
                                                
online means only, the norm should be applicable in the context of webcam child sex tourism as well. However, 
at the moment of writing of this report there is no case-law to confirm this interpretation. 
51 Incomplete information based on country report. 
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against Sexual 
Abuse  
Network 
Utilization  
Sexual 
Crimes;  
Articles 287 
and 294 of CA 
against Sexual 
Abuse 
Spain 183 bis, 171, 
172,183 
Spanish 
Criminal Code 
(SCC) 
Art. 189 SCC Article 183 bis, 
189.4. 189.5. 
189.6, 189.7 SCC 
Article 183 bis, 
189.4. 189.5. 
189.6, 189.7 SCC 
Articles 183 
bis, 185, 186 
SCC 
Article 183 ter, 
section 1 
section 2 SCC 
Turkey 105 Turkish 
Penal Code 
(TPC) – (only 
harassment)  
227 TPC and 
possibly 80 
TPC 
226 TPC 226 TPC 226, 105 TPC  
United 
States 
  18 U.S.C. § 2252  
18 U.S.C. § 2252A  
18 U.S.C. § 1466A 
18 U.S.C. § 2251 18 U.S.C. § 
1470 
18 U.S.C. § 
2422(b) 
 
3.4 Complicating factors in substantive law related to Sweetie 
In this section, the two problematic issues will be addressed when it comes to applying existing 
substantive criminal laws to cases involving Sweetie. First, Sweetie is an avatar, a virtual 
character, programmed to appear and talk as a child but clearly no real child is ever involved 
in the process. Second, the avatar does not undress and therefore no sexually explicit behaviour 
on the part of the ‘victim’ takes place. This section investigates to what extent interaction with 
Sweetie is still deemed criminal despite the lack of involvement of both a minor and explicit 
sexual behaviour.   
 
3.4.1 Virtual ‘victim’ 
Sweetie’s most important asset from an ethical perspective – the fact that it does not involve 
real children and thus does not put actual children at risk – at the same time may be problematic 
with regard to some (or most) of the criminal systems at hand and the application of their 
provisions as discussed previously. The reason for this is that the crime descriptions in most 
criminal law systems deal with real victims as opposed to ‘virtual’ victims. 
 
Criminal law protects society (in this case minors) against harm through threat of sanctions 
(general prevention). Most of the crime descriptions in criminal law therefore criminalise 
specific behaviour, which in most cases constitutes a direct threat to something or someone. 
For example, in the case of murder or homicide, human life is threatened. In the case of theft, 
personal property is at risk. Thus, most crime descriptions feature the main elements of the 
situations they aim to address, often in relation to the persons they aim to protect. Generally, if 
the completed act does not match a crime description, then that particular crime cannot be 
proven. Most of the crime descriptions examined in this research - virtual child pornography 
and grooming being notable exceptions - feature real persons (minors), given that they are the 
objects of protection. This means that without a real victim, there is no crime. Since Sweetie is 
an AI system and hence does not qualify as a natural person, interaction with Sweetie will most 
likely not fulfil most of the crime descriptions discussed previously. An interesting exception, 
however, is the Philippines, where ‘any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity 
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[…] with the aid of a computer system’ is a punishable offence. This does not require an actual 
victim at all, and the law can thus be applied to interactions with Sweetie where the perpetrator 
displays his sexual organs before the webcam. 
 
In the laws governing the sexual exploitation of minors, two types of criminal acts exist that 
do not focus on actual victims, but rather on the behaviour of the suspect and the intent that the 
particular behaviour signals. These crimes are: 1) virtual child pornography and 2) grooming. 
 
Ad 1) Virtual child pornography 
As described in section 3.2.2.3, not only real but also virtual child pornography is considered 
criminal, including computer-generated images not involving real victims. There are several 
reasons why criminal liability is also extended to virtual child pornography. These include 
avoiding evidentiary problems and the fact that the materials can be used to corrupt children, 
as well as the idea that virtual child pornography may act as a ‘stepping stone’ for consumers 
of child pornography, prompting them to move to real child pornography or possibly even 
sexual abuse.  
 
Ad 2) Grooming 
Grooming is the act of having contact with a minor for the purpose of arranging a meeting with 
this minor in order to engage in sexual activities or other lascivious conduct or to create child 
pornography. As it provides such a clear and present danger to the well-being of minors, in 
most of the jurisdictions under discussion grooming is a crime in itself, regardless of whether 
the meeting actually takes place or leads to sexual abuse. The process of grooming typically 
starts with rather innocent chats and develops through time into interactions which separately 
may constitute, among others, indecent communication, corruption of children, sextortion et 
cetera.  
 
In some jurisdictions, it is not even necessary that a real minor is groomed. In these 
jurisdictions, law enforcement’s imperative to employ investigative powers (e.g. luring 
suspects) has prompted changes to substantive criminal law. The investigative method of using 
a lure that is ostensibly a child would not be possible without the element in the crime 
description allowing for adults or virtual minors to be the object of the offence. In England and 
Wales for instance, the fact that the offender’s communications are transmitted to a virtual 
child is unproblematic in regard to section 14, SOA 2003. The section’s purposely wide 
language does not require the involvement of a child, but focuses rather on intent or belief on 
the part of the suspect that a child sex offence will take place.52 The same goes for Australia 
where for instance section 474.28 (9) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 covers virtual children 
with the term ‘fictitious recipients’. Noteworthy is also the Belgian offence of cyber-luring 
which codifies a similar rationale – according to the provision someone completes the criminal 
act upon communication with an apparent or probable minor.53 Finally, the Philippine law on 
cybersex, while not specifically focused on grooming, declares ‘any lascivious exhibition of 
                                                
52 See Gillespie, AA, Substantive and procedural legislation in England & Wales to combat webcam-related child 
sexual abuse (report on England and Wales), p. 29.  
53 Cyber luring is codified in Art. 344bis/1 of the Belgian Criminal Code. See Royer, S, Marlier, G and Conings, 
C, Substantive and procedural legislation in Belgium to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (Belgian 
report), p. 21.  
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sexual organs or sexual activity […] with the aid of a computer system’54 a punishable offence 
per se and does not require an actual victim at all. At the time of writing this report, changes 
to Dutch criminal law are pending that would also include communicating with adult persons 
in the grooming crime description, but not communicating with virtual minors.55 
 
From these two crimes we may deduce that in the area of protection against child exploitation 
substantive criminal law is not only reactive in nature and focussed on actual victims, but also 
preventative in the sense that it criminalises behaviour (regardless whether said behaviour is 
aimed at an actual minor) that may provide future danger to minors, or an indication thereof. 
 
Apart from these two offences though, directly applying substantive criminal law provisions 
to virtual characters is still an untested area in most of the jurisdictions investigated for the 
present project. This is true for instance for both the Nigerian56 and the Scottish criminal law.57  
In Canada the issue has been litigated in relation to some of the offences with the result of 
conviction of an offender who thought to be communicating with a child that never existed;58 
however, this approach is complemented by the law of attempts.59 Criminal liability through 
attempt also seems to be the only avenue for criminalising a sexually-charged interaction with 
Sweetie in Argentina, Croatia, Estonia, Israel, Poland and Turkey. Construing an attempted 
offence is further possible regarding all other relevant provisions of the countries discussed 
above and will be addressed in the section on criminalisation of attempt under section 3.5. 
 
3.4.2 No sexually explicit behaviour or nudity on the part of Sweetie 
A second complication is that Sweetie is not programmed to undress or display sexually 
explicit behaviour. This means that (the animations of) Sweetie cannot be qualified as child 
pornography given that Sweetie does not engage or seemingly engage in sexual activities or 
show genitalia primarily for sexual purposes.  
 
As a result, someone interacting with Sweetie cannot complete the offence of accessing (and 
possibly storing) child pornography. From a law enforcement perspective this is an issue, given 
that in most countries accessing (virtual) child pornography would be the go-to offence in the 
case of Sweetie.60  
 
While an attempt at accessing (virtual) child pornography might still be construed, it usually 
carries a lower maximum penalty, and in some jurisdictions might not be an offence at all. 
 
                                                
54 Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, sec 4(c)(1).  
55 Schermer, BW, Koops, BJ and Van Der Hof, S, Substantive and procedural legislation in the Netherlands to 
combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (Dutch report), p. 17.  
56 See Orji, UJ, Substantive and procedural legislation in Nigeria to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse 
(Nigerian report), section 2.3. 
57 See Richardson, A, Kerr, M and Keane, E, Substantive and procedural legislation in Scotland to combat 
webcam-related child sexual abuse (Scottish report), p. 16.   
58 See Hodge, R, Substantive and procedural legislation in Canada to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse 
(Canadian report), p. 28.  
59 See s24 of the Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
60 Many of the other offences concerning webcam sex with minors would require additional acts on the part of the 
perpetrators, such as exposing themselves. 
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3.5 Criminalisation of attempt 
The two complicating factors of Sweetie (it being a virtual victim and the absence of sexually 
explicit behaviour or nudity) have the effect that in most jurisdictions many of the criminal 
offences discussed in section 3.2.2 cannot be committed. But while a completed offence may 
be unable to be proven, an attempt might be.  
 
For a completed criminal act, the offender must have fulfilled all components of the respective 
crime description, which – put in a nutshell – refer to the objective elements (a certain act or 
omission directed against a legally protected right, which has produced a certain result), and 
the subjective elements (concerning the offender’s internal characteristics, in particular the 
intent to commit the act in question). Attempted crimes, in contrast, are prosecuted when the 
suspect has started to execute the crime he/she intended to commit, but failed to complete the 
criminal act due to external circumstances. In general, the rationale behind the criminalisation 
of an attempt lies with the dangerousness of the offender, who has failed to complete the 
intended crime at the given moment, but who has nevertheless clearly manifested activities that 
can easily result in a completed crime on the next occasion. 
 
It is clear that only a handful of offences could be directly applied to virtual victims like 
Sweetie. Most of the provisions’ descriptions require the offender’s interaction with a real 
person, whose rights and interests must be at stake. Evidently, Sweetie is a computer-generated 
character, which has no legal interests and therefore cannot fulfil said requirement. A 
completed offence against the avatar will therefore rarely be committed under the current legal 
framework. It is however worth exploring whether the missing piece of the puzzle – the crime’s 
subject – can be found through the laws of attempt. Accordingly, the following subsections 
elaborate upon the difference between a completed criminal offence and an attempted one by 
outlining the requirements of attempt, and how these apply in Sweetie’s case.  
 
3.5.1 Qualification of an attempt 
The laws governing attempt vary in the jurisdictions investigated in this study. Their 
differences manifest themselves mainly in the origin of the doctrine, the way in which it has 
been codified or in its legal consequences.61  In general, all jurisdictions criminalise attempt 
and employ similar considerations in outlining its main requirements. 
 
A criminal attempt is deemed to exist when the suspect executes an act towards the commission 
of the offence he/she intends to effectuate, said act is more than merely preparatory62 and 
                                                
61 In the USA, for instance, there is no general crime of attempt in federal law. Instead, statutes include separate 
provisions regarding the criminalisation of the attempted crime, see Unikowski, J, Substantive and procedural 
legislation in United States of America to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (US report), p. 12. In 
contrast, other jurisdiction like Argentina (Art. 42 of the Criminal Code), Australia (an attempt to commit a crime 
is a distinct offence in all Australian jurisdictions and the general doctrine is regulated by their statutes), Brazil 
(Art. 14 (2) CPB), England and Wales (s.1, Criminal Attempts Act 1981), Germany (§§ 22, 23 StGB), the 
Netherlands (Art. 45 DCC) and Poland (Art. 13 of the Criminal Code) have a general regime of attempt liability, 
whose provisions are then applied in conjunction with the ones of the respective offence. Yet other systems like 
Croatia, Belgium (articles 51-53 BCC), Nigeria (s. 4 of the Criminal Code; s. 27(1) (a) of the Cybercrimes Act) 
opt for both.  
62 Argentinian law requires a start of execution, see Art. 42 of the Criminal Code. The general trend in Australia 
also requires ‘more than merely preparatory’ acts, see Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929, at 938. The Polish 
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carried out according to the offender’s intent.63 Establishing the point at which mere 
preparation becomes a criminal attempt is a crucial part of the attempt liability, as it pinpoints 
both when a person becomes criminally liable and when authorities may intervene.64 In 
practice, however, it may be challenging to demarcate the exact start of an attempt, but this 
concern is usually left to the courts to deal with and depends on the particular facts of the case 
and the available evidence. 
 
Further, the laws of attempt differentiate between the reasons why the person failed to commit 
the crime. First, an attempt to commit a crime may fail either due to external circumstances, 
which are outside of the sphere of influence of the perpetrator.65 Second, despite completing 
the intended actions the requirements set forth in the description of the crime might not be met. 
The latter is usually referred to as inadequate or inept attempt, and although recognized by all 
criminal systems in this study, it is applied in widely varying ways. These are of particular 
importance for prosecuting individuals interacting with Sweetie and will be addressed in the 
following subsections.   
 
3.5.2 Inadequacy of an attempt  
Because Sweetie is an avatar and, therefore, from a criminal law perspective an inadequate 
object in relation to sexual crimes, criminal liability for interacting with Sweetie needs to be 
examined through the lens of the doctrine of inadequate attempt. The doctrine of impossible or 
inadequate attempt takes account of situations, in which the completion of the intended offence 
is factually or legally impossible due to the object’s unsuitability, the chosen time, or the means 
used by the perpetrator. We can distinguish between relative inadequacy of an attempt and 
absolute inadequacy of an attempt.  
 
Relative inadequacy (factual impossibility) 
Relative inadequacy occurs when an act does not bring about the results described in the crime 
description, because at the time of the attempt committing the crime was in fact impossible. In 
other words, circumstances outside the knowledge of the perpetrator make it impossible for the 
attempt to succeed. More specifically, relative inadequacy relates to the object of the crime 
and/or the means with which the crime is attempted. 
Examples of an attempt that is relatively inadequate are trying to shoot a person with an 
unloaded gun (relative inadequacy of the means), or stealing money from an empty cash 
register (relative inadequacy of the object).  
 
With a relatively inadequate attempt, the concrete facts of the case make it so that the attempt 
fails. If however the facts were as the perpetrator believed them to be, the attempt would have 
                                                
criminal system requires speaks of a ‘final and decisive action’ towards the offence in question, see Polish 
report, p. 14.   
63 The Polish system refers to offender’s ‘decision’, see p. 14 of the Polish report.   
64 Robinson, PH 2010, ‘United States’ in K Heller & M Dubber, (eds), The handbook of comparative criminal 
law, p. 579. The German attempt doctrine, for instance, has recognised several moments of commencing. The 
attempt can begin when one of the elements of the offence description is fulfilled, but also just before fulfilling 
any crime element as long as the offender undertakes steps which according to his plan are prior to the crime 
realisation and will immediately result in the completed offence. See Hakobyan, H, Webcam Sex with (Virtual) 
Children: Legislative Gaps or Criminalised Conduct? (German report), p. 65.    
65 In an online context, this would be the case if the offender’s chat conversation with the victim is suddenly 
interrupted by a poor Internet connection or temporary unavailability of the server.  
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succeeded, as a result of which the perpetrator can be charged with a criminal attempt. The 
reasoning behind criminalising this form of attempt is nicely summarised in the US case of 
State v. Moretti: 
  
When the consequences sought by a defendant are forbidden by the law as criminal, 
it is no defense that the defendant could not succeed in reaching his goal because of 
circumstances unknown to him.66 
 
Absolute inadequacy (legal impossibility) 
Absolute inadequacy refers to those situations whereby an attempt can never lead to a 
completed offence, because what was attempted is not a criminal act (or in any case does not 
match with the relevant crime description). In the case of absolute inadequacy, the perpetrator 
intends to commit a crime but by virtue of the object or the means, the intended behaviour 
cannot result in a crime in reality. An example is trying to murder a corpse (inadequate object) 
or trying to poison somebody with very strong camomile tea (inadequate means). While 
criminal intent is present, the actual behaviour does not align with the crime description. Under 
the doctrine of absolute inadequacy, the suspect can never be held criminally liable, despite a 
clear display of criminal intent. The reasoning for this is that someone cannot be held criminally 
liable for something that is not criminal, even though that person might have thought that he 
or she actually was committing a crime.  
 
Relative inadequacy is different from absolute inadequacy in that different facts could or would 
have made the attempt successful, while in the latter case the desired criminal outcome can 
never be achieved by the suspect.  
 
3.5.3 Applying the law of attempts to Sweetie 
The question is whether interacting with Sweetie would count as an attempt that is absolutely 
inadequate, or relatively inadequate. An answer to this question needs to take into account the 
circumstances of an actual case and the specifics of the doctrine of attempt in the national 
system. But having said that, we can make some general observations about applying the law 
of attempts to Sweetie.  
 
It is not straightforward to determine whether Sweetie will lead to an absolutely inadequate 
attempt, or a relatively inadequate attempt. An argument in favour of an absolutely inadequate 
attempt is that Sweetie, being a virtual person, and programmed not to undress, is an absolutely 
inadequate object. The argument would then be that it is not criminal to engage in sexual 
activities with a virtual person, even if this virtual person is posing as a minor and the 
perpetrator thought that the avatar was a real person. But even if sexual activities with a virtual 
minor is criminalised in specific jurisdiction, than Sweetie might likely still be considered as 
absolutely inadequate given that she can never show sexual organs or perform sexual activities. 
 
However, we can also take a somewhat broader perspective and qualify Sweetie as a relatively 
inadequate object for the crime of webcam sex with minors. The argument is than that the 
suspect wants to commit the crime of webcam sex with a minor and enters a chatroom with for 
                                                
66 State v Moretti, 244 A.2d 499.  
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instance twenty minors for this purpose. Unbeknownst to the suspect one of the twenty minors 
is Sweetie. The suspect is ‘unlucky’ and picks Sweetie. This case is comparable to the example 
of the cash register: under normal circumstance the crime would have been committed, but due 
to ‘bad luck’ on the part of the suspect, there is now a factual impossibility. If we are to follow 
this reasoning though, it must be clear from the behaviour of the suspect that had the suspect 
chosen a different child, the outcome of the behaviour would have been the same. 
 
The attempt liability in the case of Sweetie would thus largely depend on whether the respective 
criminal system emphasizes the objective or subjective elements of the offence. Jurisdictions 
that focus on the objective elements underline the importance of the concrete crime object, 
while those systems that focus more on the subjective elements see the alleged offender and 
his mental state as a threat for the protected ideal good: minors and their overall safety and 
well-being. In these systems the intent of the suspect is crucial. The German law of attempts, 
as it will be explained below, is the only example where both objective and subjective 
considerations are decisive for the attempt liability of the offender.   
 
In the following we illustrate which jurisdictions follow the first approach and which the latter.  
 
The law of attempts in different jurisdictions 
The country reports indicate that the doctrine’s considerations would apply in cases where the 
victim of the intended crime is virtual, and thus a part of the crime description can never be 
fulfilled. Yet, while in some jurisdictions the suspect remains punishable or receives a lower 
sentence, in others the legal impossibility completely excludes criminal liability. Thus, 
depending on the particularities of the respective criminal system and on the circumstances of 
the case, a person may be found guilty of an attempt to commit webcam sex tourism 
notwithstanding the fact that he or she did not interact with a real minor, but with Sweetie. 
 
Under Canadian, English, Israeli, Scottish and US67 law, for instance, the reason why the 
offender’s attempt failed is in most cases irrelevant,68 as long as the perpetrator undertakes 
more than preparatory actions in pursuit of the prohibited behaviour and manifests malicious 
intent. In these jurisdictions the suspect’s criminal intent (which has become apparent through 
his/ her actions) weighs more heavily than the objective fulfilment of the crime description.  
 
England’s criminal attempt law applies this premise to all offences related to webcam sex with 
minors save for s.127 of the Communications Act 2003,69 while its Scottish counterpart does 
not foresee any limitations in application.70 Canadian case law shows that Section 24 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code, which regulates attempt, is not always applied. However, this does 
                                                
67 In US law, the impossibility to victimise Sweetie is relevant as a defence that excludes punishability. Yet, such 
arguments of impossibility have not been successful in the prosecution of individuals attempting to commit a 
crime in cases where they believed that they were interacting with a child, but were in fact interacting with an 
undercover law enforcement officer. For more on the matter see the country report on the US, p. 12.  
68 See on the Australian doctrine Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476, which was followed on the Scottish case law 
Docherty v Brown [1996] JC 48 at 50; See on the law of attempt in England and Wales s.1, Criminal Attempt Act 
1981; see also s.24 (1) of the Canadian Criminal Code.  
69 The offence relates to the sending of an indecent or obscene message. It is irrelevant whether or by whom it is 
received, therefore the law of attempts is not required.  
70 See country report on Scotland, section 2.3, p. 17. However, covert operations where police Internet 
investigators have posed as children have not been challenged or judicially considered yet. 
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not have to do with normative restrictions on the application of the impossible attempts 
doctrine, but results from the fact that some offences carry included offences that are 
attempts.71 Thereby, the law addresses the activities surrounding the core offence and 
circumvents possible loopholes. Accordingly, a conviction can be pursued for any of the 
webcam offences in relation to Sweetie and it will depend on the particular circumstances of 
the case whether the prosecution relies on s.24 or on the included offence. In Israel the law of 
impossible attempt can be applied to all criminal charges regardless of the reason of 
impossibility.72 However, since the avatar does not undress, attempted aggravated indecency 
would be the most serious crime within the Israeli criminal framework.73 In addition, both 
Israeli74 and Canadian75 law place the burden of proof upon the defendant when it comes to 
demonstrating that he was not aware of actually communicating with a minor. Under Australian 
law, in principle, the common law doctrine of attempts applies as well, and a suitable offence 
(under State/ Territory laws) might be an attempt to procure a child for a sexual act. However, 
it should be noted that many of the Commonwealth offences illustrated in the tables above are 
explicitly excluded from attempt liability.76 The rationale behind the legislator’s choice is the 
fact that many of the offences are already preparatory in nature, so that adding an attempt would 
over-extend criminal liability. Further, as indicated above, the preferred approach in Australia 
has been to explicitly allow for fictitious recipients of illegal communications, so that an 
attempt, although possible to construe in some if not in all cases, is not necessary for 
prosecution. Attempt liability in Germany77 is regulated by § 22 StGB, while inadequate 
attempts are subject to the provision of § 23 (3) StGB78. According to the norm, when the 
suspect targets an inappropriate object, his liability depends on whether he evidently acted in 
‘gross ignorance’79. In case the gross ignorance was evident to a reasonably informed person 
the court may mitigate the sentence or entirely leave out the punishment. Otherwise a 
punishable inadequate attempt is given.  
 
Applying the doctrine outlined above to the case at hand means the offender would be liable 
for attempted sexual abuse pursuant to § 176 StGB, if Sweetie looks like a real child to every 
informed person. Thus, even though the avatar is an inadequate crime object because the chat 
interaction with the offender cannot be perceived by a real child, if the offender’s sexual 
performance is transferred through a webcam to the chatbot, an attempted sexual child abuse 
in accordance with §176 (4) no. 1 in combination with §§ 22, 23 StGB would likely be given. 
The same applies to the provision of §176 (4) no. 2 StGB, when the offender tries to induce 
Sweetie to perform a sexual act. In such a scenario, the suspect’s inducement would be 
                                                
71 For instance, the offence of obtaining sexual services from a minor includes also the offence of communicating 
with a person under 18 in order to obtain sexual services for consideration. See on that Canadian report, p. 29.    
72 The Israeli law of attempt is embedded in the Introductory Part of the Israeli Penal Code, Chapter 5, Article 1. 
73 See Harduf, A, Substantive and procedural legislation in Israel to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse  
(Israeli report), p. 11.  
74 See the Israeli Supreme Court decision in the case of Ktiei v Israel, LCrimA 1201/12 [9 January 2014].  
75 See for instance s. 171.1 (3) and s. 172.2(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
76 See Australian report, p. 19.  
77 See the German report.  
78 ‘Section 23 Liability for attempt. (…) 3) If the offender due to gross ignorance fails to realise that the attempt 
could under no circumstances have led to the completion of the offence due to the nature of its object or the means 
by which it was to be committed, the court may order a discharge, or mitigate the sentence as it sees fit (section 
49(2)).’ 
79 Gross ignorance (‘grober Unverstand’) is given when the suspect does not realise that under no circumstances 
his acts could complete the offence.  
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completed and would amount to an attempt, once the offender is convinced that he has done 
everything necessary to influence a child and the latter is just about to start performing.80  
 
In Poland, the law of impossible attempts in Article 13 (2) of the Criminal Code would allow 
construing a punishable attempt for the offences outlined in Art. 202a (1 and 2) and Art. 200 
(4) of the Criminal Code, i.e. the solicitation of minors for sexual purposes and corruption of 
minors respectively.81   
 
The Estonian legislation (section 26 of the Penal Code) and case law suggest that an impossible 
attempt regarding a webcam interaction with Sweetie is also likely to be punishable, especially 
in relation to the offences of sexual enticement of a child and agreement to meet a child for 
sexual purposes.82  
 
In Nigeria, a person who is approaching Sweetie for webcam sex would be punishable for an 
attempt to indecently interact with a boy or a girl (sections 216 and 222 of the Nigerian 
Criminal Code respectively), and under section 23 (3) (a) of the Nigerian Cybercrimes Act. In 
relation to the latter, section 27 (1) (a) of the Cybercrimes Act clarifies that an attempted 
offence is punishable as a principal offence under the Act. The impossibility to commit 
webcam child abuse of a virtual minor is irrelevant pursuant to section 4 of the Nigerian 
Criminal Code.  
 
The laws of attempt in Argentina, Belgium and Croatia are not as straightforward as the ones 
already discussed and therefore somewhat more challenging. 
 
In general, the laws on attempt in Argentina are applicable to all types of crimes,83 including 
all offences against sexual integrity. Art. 44 of the Argentine Criminal Code regulates the 
defence of impossibility, which reduces the sentence or even acquits the defendant when 
granted. It is in the light of this provision that courts consider (attempts to commit) impossible 
crimes. However, it appears that there are no clear criteria on how courts engage in an 
assessment of the action’s efficacy in bringing about the intended crime.84 Therefore, while the 
provision’s rationale would apply to the case of Sweetie, it is unclear how and with what 
outcome.      
 
In Belgium, the criminal liability for attempting a particular offence will depend on the offence 
itself.85 The attempt to commit a crime is always punishable, while the attempt to commit a 
misdemeanour is punishable if the law explicitly provides it. In the case of Sweetie one of the 
potentially relevant offences is attempting indecent assault. However, a prosecution’s outcome 
                                                
80 In the context of webcam child sex tourism, an indication for that could be that Sweetie agrees to perform and 
provides the means for the transfer of rewards (e.g. bank account number).  
81 See country report on Poland, p. 14.  
82 Kala, K, Substantive and procedural legislation in Estonia to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse 
(Estonian report), pp. 22-23.  
83 Ferrante, M 2010 ‘Argentina’ in K Heller & M Dubber, (eds), p. 29.  
84 Ferrante, M 2010 ‘Argentina’ in K Heller & M Dubber, (eds), p. 31.  
85 Attempts to possess or access virtual child pornography are not punishable, see Art. 383bis BCC. The same 
applies to the attempt to commit the offence of publicly outraging morality by actions who offend modesty, Art. 
385 BCC. See for more on the matter Belgian report, p. 22.  
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will very much depend on the court’s approach towards impossible attempts. If the protected 
object (here minors, who are not at risk through the act since Sweetie is not a minor) is deemed 
more relevant than the subjective state of mind of the offender, acts involving Sweetie will not 
be punishable.86 Furthermore, an attempt to access (virtual) child pornography is also not 
punishable in Belgium. 
 
The Croatian law of attempts in its turn does not substantively differ from the already discussed 
doctrines.87 Inadequate attempts are punishable as ordinary ones, but here it is the interpretation 
of the attempts provision that turns out to be problematic. A perpetrator attempting to commit 
an offence by inappropriate means or against an inappropriate subject may be exempted from 
liability due to ‘rough irrationality’88. However, Croatian law does not provide a definition of 
‘rough irrationality’ and courts have not dealt with the term either. Whether an offender is 
exempted from punishment in each case of rough irrationality, or only when his/ her criminal 
intent results from the rough irrationality, remains unclear. To what extent impossible attempts 
have an impact on cases involving Sweetie is still to be determined.    
  
A final remark concerns impossible attempts under Dutch, Spanish and Turkish criminal law. 
Dutch (case) law distinguishes between relatively inadequate and absolutely inadequate 
attempts. An attempt to have webcam sex with Sweetie would most likely constitute an 
absolutely inadequate attempt, which is not punishable regardless of the criminal intent of the 
alleged perpetrator.89 A possibility to use Sweetie under current Dutch criminal law might be 
found in the article on child pornography (240b Sr). As indicated previously,90 the crime of 
child pornography does not require that a person below the age of 18 is pictured. The inclusion 
of ‘seemingly involved’ in the provision means that virtual child pornography is punishable as 
well. The addition of the text ‘seemingly involved’ negates the issue that Sweetie is considered 
an absolute inadequate object given the fact she is not a real girl. As such, trying to get access 
via webcam to child pornography, or trying to produce and possess child pornography by 
recording and storing the webcam stream, even if involving an avatar, could be construed as a 
criminal attempt at accessing (or producing or possessing) child pornography. While this 
negates the issue of the virtual nature of Sweetie, it does not necessarily mean Sweetie is then 
an adequate object. Given that Sweetie will never portray sexual behaviour or any nudity for 
that matter, as it is not part of her programmed features, she might still qualify as absolutely 
inadequate on those grounds. If Sweetie were programmed to show sexual behaviour or sexual 
organs this would make proving the suspects’ intent to have criminal webcam sex more 
straightforward, but this is not the case at present.  
 
                                                
86 See Belgian report, p. 22.  
87 See Bojić, I, Substantive and procedural legislation in the Republic of Croatia to combat webcam-related child 
sexual abuse (Croatian report), p. 20. 
88 The respective provision reads: ‘The perpetrator who attempts to commit a criminal offense by inappropriate 
means or against an inappropriate object, due to the rough irrationality, may be exempted from punishment.’ See 
Croatian report, p. 20.  
89 See Dutch report, pp. 5 and 16.  
90 See section 3.2.1 Virtual ‘victim’ of this report.   
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The Spanish criminal system in general does not punish impossible attempts.91 However, recent 
case law has opened up the possibility for punishing impossible attempts by stipulating that 
impossible attempts should be punished when an ex ante evaluation of the suspect’s conduct 
leads a reasonable person to believe that the consummation of the offense was possible even 
though an ex post study of the facts reveals that it was impossible for the actor to consummate 
the offense.92 Consequently it could be argued that if a reasonable person sees Sweetie in the 
webcam stream and believes it to be a real ten-year old, an attempt would still be construed 
even if in the aftermath it is revealed to the person that the child he/ she saw was a computer-
generated fiction. It remains to be seen how this approach will be implemented in prosecuting 
suspects of online sex crimes involving an inadequate object, such as Sweetie.  
 
In Turkey, impossible attempts are recognised as a legal construct, the consequences of which 
are unclear. Some argue that impossible attempts should be punishable, but others do not agree. 
So far, the courts have not settled the dispute,93 as a result of which it is unclear whether an 
interaction with Sweetie might amount to an attempted sexual harassment pursuant to Art. 105 
of the Turkish Criminal Code.  
 
The table below gives an overview of the possibilities for criminalising (attempted) webcam 
sex with Sweetie. The fields marked in green refer to provisions which can be applied without 
further ado, while those in orange relate to provisions whose use in the context at hand has not 
been confirmed in case law yet. Red indicates that no provision applies.      
 
Table 4: Criminalisation of (attempted) webcam sex with Sweetie 
 18. 
Sexual 
abuse 
19. child 
prostitution 
20. child 
pornography 
21. 
pornographic 
performances 
22. corruption 
of children 
23. Online 
solicitation 
(grooming) 
Argentina Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly attempt Possibly attempt Possibly attempt 131 ACC 
Australia 272.11 
Criminal 
Code Act 
1995 
(CCA) 
(attempt) 
 474.19 CCA 
474.20 CCA 
 
 474.27A 474.28(9) CCA 
Belgium      433 bis 1 BCC 
Art. 143 §3bis 
Act Regarding 
Electronic 
Communication 
Brazil       
                                                
91 See Agustina, JR and Valverde, R, Substantive and procedural legislation Spain to combat webcam-related 
child sexual abuse (Spanish report), p. 14. For more on the matter see also Gómez-Jara, C and Chiesa, LE 2010 
‘Spain’ in K Heller & M Dubber, (eds), p. 503. 
92 Gómez-Jara, C and Chiesa, LE 2010 ‘Spain’ in K Heller & M Dubber, (eds), p. 503. SSCS February 16, 2007, 
available from: www.westlaw.es, Ref: RJ 2007\2381.  
93 See country report on Turkey, section 2.2.3, p. 18.  
 40 
Canada  152 CCC 
(attempt) 
286.12 CCC 
(attempt) 
286.32 CCC 
(attempt) 
163.1 CCC 
(attempt) 
   
Croatia Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly 
attempt 
163 CrCC Possibly attempt Possibly attempt Possibly attempt 
England 
and Wales 
8, 10, 17, 
SOA 2003 
(attempt) 
47, 48, 50 SOA 
(attempt) 
7(7), Protection of 
Children Act 1978 
(possibly attempt) 
 12 SOA (attempt) 14, 15 SOA 
(attempt) 
Estonia Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly 
attempt 
178 EPC Possibly attempt 179 EPC 1781EPC 
Germany Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly an attempt 
of 184b (3) StGB 
 Possibly attempt  Possibly attempt  
Israel Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly 
attempt 
Possibly attempt Possibly attempt Possibly attempt Possibly attempt 
Netherlands       
Nigeria 216, 222 
NCC 
222NCC  23(3) (c) NCA jo 
27(1) 
NCA (attempt) 
 
23(3)(c) jo 27(1) 
NCA (attempt) 
23(3)a jo 27(1) 
NCA(attempt) 
Philippines     Possible attempt 
at cybersex 
(showing 
genitalia) 
3(h), 3(i) 
Possibly attempt 
Poland 204 (4) 
Polish 
Criminal 
Code 
(PCC), 
possibly 
attempt 
199 (3), 200 
(1), 203, 204 
PCC, possibly 
attempt 
202 §3, 4, 4a, 4b, 4c 
PCC. Possibly 
attempt 
200a PCC. 
Possibly attempt 
200 §3, 4, 5 PCC. 
Possibly attempt 
200a PCC. 
Possibly attempt 
Scotland  9 PCPSO 
(attempt) 
       23, 24, 25, 33, 34, 
35 Section 23 
Sexual Offences 
Act 2009 
(attempt) 
1, 9 PCPSO 
(attempt) 
South 
Korea 
 12 (2), 13 (2) 
APJSA  
(possibly 
attempt) 
44-7(1)1 of  the Act 
on Information 
Promotion  and 
Protection, and  
Communications 
Network Utilization  
(possibly attempt) 
287 and 294 of 
CA (possibly 
attempt) 
13 (2) of  the Act 
on Special Cases 
concerning the 
Punishment, 
ETC. of Sexual 
Crimes (attempt);  
287 and 294 of 
CA (possibly 
attempt) 
12 (2), 13 (2) 
APJSA (possibly 
attempt) 
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Spain   Article 183 bis, 
189.4, 189.5, 189.6, 
189.7 SCC (attempt) 
   
Turkey 105 
Turkish 
Penal 
Code 
(TPC), 
possibly 
attempt 
227, 80 TPC, 
possibly 
attempt  
226 TPC, possibly 
attempt 
226 TPC, 
possibly attempt 
226 TPC, 
possibly attempt 
 
United 
States 
  18 U.S.C. § 2252, 
2252A, § 1466A 
(possibly attempts) 
18 U.S.C. § 2251 
(possibly 
attempt) 
18 U.S.C. § 1470 
(possibly attempt) 
18 U.S.C. § 
2422(b) (attempt) 
 
 
3.6 Summary and conclusion 
Most of the criminal systems discussed in the previous sections seem well-equipped to combat 
webcam sexual crimes against real minors. Some have introduced new legislation to 
specifically tackle these types of online crimes, while others do not distinguish between online 
and real world offences, and thus do not encounter systematic difficulties in applying the 
criminal norms to the cyber environment.  
 
However, we do see a divergence in how webcam sex is criminalised. As will be shown in the 
following chapters, this finding impacts the possibilities for cross-border law enforcement, and 
often impacts the outcome of transnational investigation procedures.   
 
In some countries, webcam child sex tourism is considered sexual abuse or sexual harassment, 
while in others it is a form of child pornography but does not fall under the heading of sexual 
abuse. Generally speaking though, most countries under examination have a full inventory of 
crimes that can apply to webcam sex tourism. What is relevant to consider in this context is 
that different types of interactions between victim and perpetrator may trigger different articles 
under (domestic) criminal law. For instance, merely talking to a minor without sexual content 
or hinting at sexual activities94, does not yet trigger any criminal law provisions, but sending 
indecent pictures or promoting sexual activities falls under the heading of corruption of a minor 
and possibly even grooming. When the victim is engaged in sexual activities and/or genitalia 
are exposed via webcam, this may trigger offences such as child pornography and pornographic 
performances, and possibly sexual assault. If payment is involved, provisions regarding child 
prostitution come into play. Finally, if the perpetrator exposes him/herself and masturbates or 
forces or coerces the victim to do or undergo sexual activities, this may constitute corruption 
of minors or even sexual assault.  
 
                                                
94 Please note that a sexualised conversation could be for instance an offence in England and Wales under the 
Communications Act 2003. Further, a typed conversation could amount to an offence under the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959. Also, when s.15A, Sexual Offences Act 2003 comes into force it would be illegal under 
that provision. 
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While all countries under investigation have criminalised webcam sex in one way or another, 
the situation is less clear-cut when Sweetie, a chatbot rather than a person, is involved in the 
interactions. In a few countries webcam sex with a virtual person is criminalised (see Table 5 
below). In these countries, the criminal law provisions focus on the behaviour and the intent 
thereof, rather than on the behaviour in relation to the result it brought about. 
 
In those countries where the crime descriptions only mention real minors as the object of 
protection, interaction with Sweetie may still qualify as an attempt at illegal webcam sex. In 
this area we see a further divergence. In some countries an attempt at webcam sex with Sweetie 
can be construed95, in other countries an attempt at webcam sex with Sweetie is not deemed 
criminal because it qualifies as an impossible attempt. What is clear from our investigation that 
for most countries it still very much unclear whether prosecuting an attempt would be 
successful. It also relevant to note that an attempt generally carries a lower maximum penalty 
than a completed offence. 
 
Finally, in those jurisdictions where neither a completed offence nor an attempt can be 
construed because of the virtual nature of Sweetie, interaction with Sweetie may still be 
qualified as an attempt to access to child pornography. However, in these countries we should 
also take into account the fact that an attempt may still be impossible given the fact that Sweetie 
will never show sexual organs or perform sexual acts. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions an 
attempt to access child pornography is not criminal in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
95 It must be noted though that in most of these countries the possibility of webcam sex with virtual minors has 
not been tested in court. 
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Table 5: Criminalisation of webcam sex 
 Webcam sex 
criminalised 
Webcam sex with 
virtual person 
criminalised 
Attempt at webcam 
sex with virtual 
person criminalised 
Argentina X - X (only likely for 
grooming)  
Australia X X X 
Belgium X X (for the offence of 
cyber luring) 
X (depending on the 
interpretation) 
Brazil X - - 
Canada X X X 
Croatia X X X (no case law yet) 
England and Wales X -  X 
Estonia X X (no case law yet) X (no case law yet) 
Germany X - X 
Israel  X - X 
Netherlands X - -  
Nigeria X - X 
Philippines X - X 
Poland X - X 
Scotland X X (not tested yet) X 
South Korea X -  X (no case law yet) 
Spain  X - X (child pornography 
only) 
Turkey X (only regarding sexual 
harassment) 
- X (possible, not tested 
yet) 
USA X - X 
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4 Criminal procedural law aspects 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since Sweetie is intended as an investigative tool for law enforcement in online investigations, 
its implementation in law enforcement operations is governed by the laws of criminal 
procedure.96 In this chapter we investigate what (online) investigatory powers are available in 
the jurisdictions involved in this study, and how these powers apply to Sweetie. 
 
4.2 Human rights protection in (online) investigations 
 
Human rights serve first and foremost as a control tool for modern state bureaucracy against 
structural injustices.97 In this role, they perform a ‘check and balance’ function for states using 
coercive investigative powers. While international human rights law imposes on states the 
negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the exercise of human rights, this duty is 
balanced by the exigencies of everyday life and the positive state obligation to proactively 
protect the individual’s rights from violations.98  
 
In procedural criminal law, the interplay of these obligations is reflected in the enactment of 
special investigatory powers on the one hand (which temporarily limit the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of the citizen in the fight against crime), and in the set-up of procedural rules 
that regulate, oversee and limit said special powers on the other. In either case, specific 
requirements must be met, some of which depend on the specific nature of the right itself, while 
others, as will be shown below, are of a more general nature.  
 
It should be noted that in the European context, the ECtHR is particularly present in the human 
rights context and has assumed an active role in the interpretation of the ECHR. The Court’s 
finding that both negative and positive human rights obligations stem from the ECHR in the 
context of law enforcement has been also widely followed and adopted by other human rights 
mechanisms, such as for instance the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The consideration of 
both positive and negative state obligations is thus a largely recognised tenet when it comes to 
the effective enforcement of individual rights. 
 
In this research, we will focus specifically on the negative human rights obligations, and the 
extent to which states are permitted to infringe human rights for the purpose of combating 
webcam sex tourism.  
 
4.2.1 Criminal procedure law requirements 
Human rights have been decisive in shaping constitutional guarantees and hence have 
implications for the reach of state powers and the use of special investigative techniques. These 
                                                
96 Note that Sweetie may also be used as a deterrent. However, if Sweetie is used as a deterrent, it is likely only 
effective if there is a risk for the perpetrator that his behaviour may ultimately be exposed. In other words, if 
Sweetie is used as an investigative method. 
97 Bielefeldt, H 2012 ‘Philosophical and Historical Foundations of Human Rights’ in  
C Krause & M Scheinin, (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, pp. 14-15.  
98 Bielefeldt, H 2012 ‘Philosophical and Historical Foundations of Human Rights’ in  
C Krause & M Scheinin, (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, pp. 14-15. 
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powers have to abide by certain requirements to ensure the integrity of the criminal procedure 
and the reliability of the obtained evidence. In addition, special investigative powers often have 
to remain the exception to the rule.99 Consequently, state agencies may interfere with the 
individuals’ rights only in exceptional circumstances and pursuant to the requirements of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. Furthermore, the use of intrusive state methods is only allowed 
if they are in accordance with the legality principle, in other words, if they have a specific legal 
basis in the law of criminal procedure.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), more specifically 8 ECHR, gives a good 
overview of the elements needed when doing the balancing test between law enforcement 
requirements and human rights. We will therefore use it as our point of departure for the 
discussion on criminal procude law aspects. The elements the ECHR stipulates are the 
following: 
 
Necessity 
Necessity refers to the test of ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The latter implies in its core 
a finding of proportionality,100 while at the same time considering the particular circumstances 
of the case, including ‘the nature, scope and duration of the measures, the grounds required for 
ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them and the 
kind of remedy provided by the national law’.101 The proportionality test ensures that 
investigative tools and methods impair the legitimate interests of the alleged offender in a way 
that is reasonably proportionate to the harm committed or threatened.102  
 
Subsidiarity  
The principle of subsidiarity requires law enforcement to employ a more intrusive means of 
investigation only where less intrusive solutions would be substantially less or not at all 
effective, and would thus jeopardise the aspired operation. We found that this tenet has been 
widely adopted by the investigated jurisdictions.  
 
In accordance with the law (principle of legality) 
Last but not least, criminal procedures can only take place, if and in a manner provided by the 
law. The rationale behind this principle of legality is strictly connected with legal certainty and 
aims to ensure that norms are available and accessible prior to the procedure that is being set 
in motion. Further, criminal procedures need to be foreseeable and predictable. This means that 
national laws need to be sufficiently clear as to under what circumstances law enforcement can 
make use of special investigatory methods. Individuals should also be able to determine which 
authority or mechanism implements and oversees the investigations. 
 
                                                
99 The country studies drafted for the purpose of this reports reveal that this is true for the majority of the civil law 
countries.  
100 Klass and others v Germany, Application no. 5029/7149, § 50; Weber and Saravia v Germany, Application 
no. 54934/00, § 116–118.  
101 Weber and Saravia v Germany, § 106.  
102 Ashworth, A and Horder, J 2013, Principles of criminal law, Oxford University Press, p. 56.  
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4.3 Use of investigative powers in an online context 
In order to protect human rights and to safeguard the integrity of the criminal investigation, the 
principle of legality as described above stipulates that special investigative methods require a 
basis in the law. This has led to an inventory of special investigative powers codified in the 
laws of the jurisdictions under examination. Below (see table 6) we provide an overview which 
investigatory powers are available in the selected countries.  
 
The specific investigative powers used in an online context are codified in the jurisdictions 
under examination more or less along the lines of those described in the Cybercrime 
Convention. Therefore, as it provides the most harmonised international framework governing 
the use of investigative powers, we use the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime as 
the framework for discussing investigative powers in an online context. 
 
Given the close resemblance of Sweetie to the work of undercover agents, we will also discuss 
this investigative power, even though the Cybercrime Convention does not cover it. 
 
 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
Article 16. Expedited preservation of stored computer data 
 
Article 17. Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data 
 
Article 18. Production order 
 
Article 19. Search and seizure of stored computer data 
 
Article 20. Real-time collection of traffic data 
 
Article 21. Interception of content data 
Other: Undercover operations conducted on the internet. 
 
The countries examined in this report have codified the use of investigative powers in different 
ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
Table 6: Codification of investigative powers in the selected jurisdictions 
 Preservatio
n of stored 
computer 
data 
Preservatio
n of traffic 
data 
Productio
n orders 
Search 
and 
seizure 
of stored 
compute
r data 
Real-
time 
collectio
n of 
traffic 
data 
Interceptio
n of 
content 
data 
Undercove
r 
operations 
Argentina - - X X - X X 
Australia X X X X X X X 
Belgium X X X X X X X 
Brazil X X X X X X X103 
Canada X X X X X X X 
Croatia X X X X X X X 
England 
and Wales 
X X X X X X X 
Estonia X X X X X X X 
Israel  - - X X X X - 
Netherland
s 
X X X X X X X 
Nigeria X X X X X X - 
Philippines X X X X - - - 
Poland X - X X - X X 
Scotland /104 / / / X X / 
South  
Korea 
- - - X - - - 
Spain  X X X X X X X 
Turkey X X X X X X X 
USA X X X X X X X 
 
 
The table above shows that the studied jurisdictions - with the exception of South Korea - have 
largely accommodated procedural provisions regarding undercover policing and online 
investigative techniques within their respective laws. In the following, we elaborate upon the 
necessary safeguards and admissibility conditions in relation to investigative powers in order 
to protect the rights and interests of individuals. 
 
4.4 Sweetie as an investigative method 
Before applying the procedural framework to Sweetie, we need to establish what kind of an 
investigative tool the avatar actually presents. We therefore first elaborate upon the nature of 
the chatbot/ avatar as an investigation tool and then establish whether and how its features fit 
the legal framework of criminal procedure described above.    
                                                
103 Only regarding infiltration operations, see Law n.º 12.850/2013, available at: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12850.htm. [9 August 2016].  
104 Insufficient information available from country report.  
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As described at the beginning of this study, Sweetie is an AI tool developed to facilitate the 
work of law enforcement agencies in online operations. As an AI agent, the chatbot would 
operate in open (public) online systems without direct human intervention, thereby enjoying a 
certain autonomy in conduct. Further, the chatbot/avatar will be used as a lure for the alleged 
offender, but will also be capable of interacting with the suspect and recording and storing their 
interactions as well as available information on the offender, such as for instance his IP address.  
 
The use of Sweetie as an investigative tool is not specifically covered in any of the jurisdictions 
in this study. In fact, no explicit rules exist on the use of AI agents for the purpose of criminal 
investigations. However, undercover investigations usually make use of a number of technical 
tools and coercive powers that resemble Sweetie’s features. For instance, when placing a lure, 
law enforcement may either use physical objects, such as cars or bikes (or other goods 
depending on the crime), or stage an officer with a fake identity. Undercover agents that interact 
with suspects within a criminal organisation also make use of fake identities and usually do so 
in the framework of an infiltration operation. Further, in order to get access to the suspect’s 
communications, state agencies use wiretapping and interception devices, and additional 
technological means capable of processing and storing the obtained data. Accordingly, given 
the lack of similar examples and against the background of its technical features, for the 
purposes of the present study the chatbot will be characterised and dealt with as a ‘hybrid’ 
investigation tool that combines the capacities of the different investigative tools mentioned 
above.  
 
4.5 Authorised use of Sweetie by law enforcement 
The fact that Sweetie is a new investigative technique and existing investigative powers do not 
explicitly refer to any software or technology comparable to it, does not per se exclude the use 
of AI for investigative purposes. The use of the chatbot is possible as long as its application 
stays within the boundaries established by the law.  
 
As Sweetie is designed to identify and engage suspects in a manner comparable to undercover 
investigators, the rules regulating the latter will be decisive for its application. Further, the 
chatbot will collect certain information on the alleged offender and its devices, and store the 
content of the communications between that person and Sweetie for investigation purposes. 
Consequently, the rules authorising these different investigative powers would conjointly be 
applicable in the case of the chatbot. 
 
Whether the use of Sweetie is allowed depends on an answer to the following questions: 
 
1) Does Sweetie lead to a substantial risk of infringement of human rights in the context of a 
criminal investigation?105 
 
If so, 
 
                                                
105 If the answer to this question is negative, than there is no need to further question and codify the use of Sweetie 
as an investigative method from a human rights and criminal law perspective. 
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2) Is the use of Sweetie ‘necessary in a democratic society’? 
 
3) Is the use of Sweetie ‘in accordance with the law’, that is to say, should there either be a 
specific legal basis regulating its use, or should its use be otherwise governed by procedural 
requirements? 
 
Below we will answer these questions. 
 
4.6 Possible human rights infringements through Sweetie 
Before we discuss the investigative powers that might come into play when regulating Sweetie, 
we need to establish whether a specific investigative power is actually necessary. This means 
determining whether and how human rights infringements may take place when using Sweetie. 
When we observe the use of Sweetie, two fundamental rights of suspects may be particularly 
at risk:  
 
1) privacy (given that Sweetie may engage in conversations and record any 
communications), and  
2) the right to a fair trial (given that Sweetie may entrap suspects). 
 
If these rights are infringed upon by using Sweetie, a specific investigative power that satisfies 
the procedural guarantees of legality, proportionality and subsidiarity would have to be in 
place. 
 
4.6.1 Privacy 
The right to privacy is recognised throughout the world. Even though with differing degrees of 
relevance, both in common and civil law traditions distinctions are made between the public 
sphere and the private sphere, and case law has evolved to facilitate the differentiation. It is 
generally held that in the public sphere, a suspect has less of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The level of protection provided though differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
 
Australia, for instance, has a comparatively undeveloped right to privacy.106 The cogency and 
relevance of the obtained evidence is usually prioritised over the privacy interest of the suspect 
even if said evidence has not been obtained in a public communication. Under the ECHR, on 
the other hand, persons can have a privacy interest in the public sphere, in particular when their 
behaviour is recorded.107 Under the US Constitution, however, a reasonable expectation of 
                                                
106 Australia does not have a constitutional Bill of Rights, which impacts the scope of the due process protection 
of the suspect. The common law protection against excessive privacy intrusions is more property-oriented, and 
usually the threatened public interests trump the individual ones. For instance, in the case of O'Neill v R ([1995] 
81 A Crim R 458) the court considered the use of listening devices a desirable methodology against the risk of 
untrue confessions by untrustworthy informers, instead of raising privacy concerns and how these affect the 
suspect’s interests.  
107 See e.g. Von Hannover v Germany, Application no. 59320/00, and Peck v United Kingdom, Application no. 
44647/98.  
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privacy in public spaces and with regard to information divulged to third parties is more 
limited.108  
 
Yet, while the distinction between public and private is relatively straightforward in the 
physical world, it is much less so on the Internet. This raises questions with regard to the use 
of Sweetie by law enforcement.   
 
Whether or not Sweetie’s use would lead to a substantial infringement of the suspect’s privacy 
rights depends on the particular circumstances of the case. When it comes to Sweetie we can 
distinguish two situations from a privacy perspective: 1) Sweetie being present in a public 
chatroom, and 2) Sweetie directly interacting with a suspect one-on-one in a private 
(video)chat. 
 
Sweetie being present in a public chatroom 
With regard to Sweetie merely being present in a public chatroom, the privacy infringement 
seems limited. But of course Sweetie just being present does not yet serve a clear law 
enforcement purpose. This may change though if Sweetie records (logs) the conversations in 
the chat. In these cases, there might be a substantial infringement of privacy. However, as it 
stands this is still the subject of debate.109 
 
In general, information that is made publicly available on the Internet may be gathered by law 
enforcement as evidence in a criminal investigation without the need for a specific legal 
basis.110 However, the question becomes more difficult if the information is stored, or if 
publicly available information is monitored for an extended period. In these cases, the privacy 
infringements may be of a different nature, because the scope, scale and duration are different 
when compared to offline cases. In the jurisdictions examined, there is as of yet limited case 
law or specific legislation governing this issue. In the Netherlands, for instance, there is an 
ongoing discussion to what extent open source data (e.g. blogposts, public Facebook profiles, 
Twitter feeds) may be monitored on a more structural basis.111 A similar debate can also be 
witnessed in the UK, accentuating that reading something that is behind password protection, 
even if its end result is an open source post, would normally engage privacy expectations 
covered by Art. 8 ECHR.112   
 
In any case the goal of Sweetie 2.0 is not to monitor public chatrooms and discussions. Rather, 
Sweetie is deployed as a lure in the public chatroom in order to engage with potential child sex 
offenders. As such, the possible privacy infringements that take place in the context of one-
one-one conversations and interactions are likely to be more relevant. 
 
One-on-one conversations and interaction 
                                                
108 See e.g., Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), United States v Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), Smith 
v Maryland, 442 US 735, 744 (1979); Hoffa v United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v United States, 
373 U.S. 427 (1963).  
109 See for instance Koops, BJ 2013, ‘Police investigations in Internet open sources: Procedural-law 
issues’, Computer Law & Security Review, 29(6), pp. 654-665. 
110 See for instance US country report, section 3.4.1, p. 22.  
111 Koops, BJ 2013, ‘Police investigations in Internet open sources: Procedural-law issues’, pp. 654-665. 
112 England and Wales report, section 3.3, p. 46.  
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Once Sweetie has been approached for a chat there is the possibility to log the conversation 
(text, audio and video). These chats can subsequently be used as evidence.  
 
Private chatrooms and one-on-one conversations are generally regarded as more privacy-
sensitive.113 Participating in or eavesdropping on conversations as law enforcement official is 
generally considered an interference with the suspect’s private life, requiring the use of special 
investigative powers subject to authorisation by a public prosecutor or (investigative) judge.114  
 
Personal communications and information stored on or transmitted through personal electronic 
devices are generally protected by the right to privacy115 as described in amongst others, Art. 
17 ICCPR, Art. 8 ECHR and the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution. These 
instruments protect the individual’s ‘freedom from unwarranted and unreasonable intrusion 
into activities […] belonging to the realm of individual autonomy’.116   
 
An interference with the right to privacy may be justified under Art. 8 (2) ECHR as long as the 
public authority’s actions are ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ and pursue ‘legitimate aims’. The ‘legitimate aims’ include, among others, also crime 
and disorder prevention and protection of the rights of others. Art. 17 ICCPR does not include 
an explicit constraint clause, providing instead that ‘no one should be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference’. In the years of practice the two bodies guarding the conventions, the 
ECtHR and the HRC respectively, have aligned their approaches and have established very 
similar assessment criteria of how a permissible limitation of the right looks like.117 They 
examine in the first place whether the interference with the individual’s privacy is lawful/in 
accordance with the law, which means that the investigative power in question should have a 
proper legal basis. They further consider criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity that must 
be satisfied as well.  
 
The tests of legality, proportionality and subsidiarity have been widely translated into the 
criminal systems of the studied countries.118 Following its considerations, most of them have 
enacted legislation that allows law enforcement to (temporarily) infringe upon privacy rights 
                                                
113 See Koops, BJ 2013, ‘Police investigations in Internet open sources: Procedural-law issues’, pp. 654-665. 
114 A notable exception is the United States. US citizens have no reasonable expectation with regard to 
information they voluntarily disclose to another person, even if this person turns out to be an undercover law 
enforcement agent (see e.g. Hoffa v United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).  
115 Art. 8 ECHR uses the term ‘private life’, while Art. 17 ICCPR speaks of ‘privacy’. Here both terms are used 
synonymously, as despite the linguistic differences in the two English texts it is widely recognized that ‘privacy’ 
and ‘private life’ mean the same thing.  
116 Wilborn, SE 1997, ‘Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace’, p. 833.  
117 Georgieva, I 2015, ‘The Right to Privacy under Fire Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and 
Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR’, p.104. 
118 In Brazil, the right to privacy is constitutionally guaranteed and said guarantee can be temporarily suspended 
in matters of public interest, especially in criminal investigations with judicial authorization. The investigative 
authority in Canada is constrained by the Canadian Charter of Rights, and in particular by its s.8 that covers the 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, from which the common law has deduced a right to privacy and 
a doctrine of reasonable expectations of privacy. See also Section 26 (2) of the Estonian Constitution and Articles 
10 – 13 of the Dutch Constitution. In Israel, the constitutional limitations of investigative powers are 
comparatively weak, see country report on Israel, p. 14. In Spain, respect for the right to privacy and the 
confidentiality of communications is reflected in the guiding principles of Art. 588bis a). The Nigerian 
Constitution guarantees the right to privacy (Section 37), but it is not absolute and can be restricted (Section 45 
(1) of the 1999 Constitution).  
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of citizens for investigative purposes.119 In most cases, an independent body is to authorise the 
measures of a more intrusive character provided that the latter have already been enacted and 
specified by the law.120 The criminal procedural laws thus clearly distinguish between intrusive 
and less intrusive investigation powers, the latter of which do not always require a specific 
legal basis. 
 
In summary, we can say that Sweetie may indeed infringe the privacy of suspects, and will do 
so in particular in one-on-one conversations, and even more so if such conversations are 
logged/recorded. Therefore, its use must both be necessary in a democratic society and in 
accordance with the law. This will be further analysed below (see s. 4.7 and 4.8).  
 
4.6.2 Fair trial (entrapment) 
In the context of criminal procedure, the right to a fair trial protects individuals against arbitrary 
application of state power, and guarantees the effective realisation of other fundamental rights 
and liberties through fair judicial proceedings.121 Fair trial rights may also extend to the pre-
trial phase. Consequently, it also covers situations in which law enforcement officials use a 
fake identity, simulate a sale or purchase, or offer simulated business services to trap a suspect, 
as in such cases the suspect’s fate is ‘surrendered’ to the power advantage of the state. The 
right to a fair trial and its considerations balance the power relation between the individual and 
the state.  
 
From a procedural law perspective, the use of Sweetie for engaging suspects raises two issues 
regarding the fair trial rights of the suspect. They are: 1) operating Sweetie in public chatrooms 
upon a general suspicion may constitute non-targeted entrapment that is considered random 
virtue-testing, and 2) its direct interaction with suspects may amount to unlawful incitement of 
crimes.  
 
                                                
119 Under Croatian law it is Art. 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act; s.111 of the Estonian Electronic 
Communications Act (ECA).  
120 In a recent landmark case, R v Spencer [2014] 2 SCR 212, 2014 SCC 43 (CanLII), the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that subscriber information can no longer be obtained by the authorities from Internet service 
providers without a corresponding court authorization. Art. 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act of Croatia 
stipulates that restrictions of privacy rights can be legally implemented only upon a court order, leaving the state 
attorney a discretion to issue a warrant in urgent cases for the duration of 24 hours. See Croatian report, pp. 25-
27. In Belgium, according to Art. 88bis and Art. 88ter CCP the intervention of the investigatory judge is necessary 
whenever traffic or localization data is required, or when a network search has to be performed. In England and 
Wales, S.65 (1) RIPA has (controversially) created the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which supervises the 
techniques awarded by RIPA to police and security services. In Argentina, a judicial authorization is needed 
whenever investigatory powers imply a violation of privacy rights, see Salt, M and Dupuy, D, Substantive and 
procedural legislation in Argentina to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (Country report on Argentina), 
section 3.2.2. In Australia, the statutes mirror the protection thresholds of the Cybercrime Convention on personal 
information by, among others, requiring a warrant to allow access to existing or prospective computer data, see 
country report on Australia, pp. 21-23. In Brazil, it is also the judicial authority that is considering the 
proportionality of the measure and the factual reasoning supporting the request for an interception warrant. In 
Nigeria, law enforcement authorities must obtain judicial authorization before carrying out an interception, see 
s.39 of the Cybercrimes Act. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines foresees in its Art. III sec 3 (1) a judicial 
warrant or a court order as well. The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure balances investigative powers with the 
requirement of a court order as well, see Art. 237 CCP and Art. 218 CCP. In the US, under the Fourth Amendment, 
law enforcement must generally obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search in a computer owned by the suspect, 
see US country report, p. 15.  
121 Ballin, MFH 2012, Anticipative Criminal Investigation, p. 55.  
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1) Operating Sweetie in public chatrooms  
Operating Sweetie upon a general suspicion means that the avatar would not target a particular 
suspect, but an area or space (in the present case particular cyber-areas such as chatrooms). 
This raises concerns in terms of the fair trial rights of the suspects, as undercover powers are 
usually the exception to the rule, and generally aimed at suspects against whom there is a prior 
suspicion.  
 
2) Direct interaction 
A further concern is Sweetie’s interaction with the suspects in chat conversations. A direct 
interaction bears the risk of influencing the suspect and thus leading him/her into committing 
an offence he/she would have otherwise not committed. Consequently, Sweetie may lead to 
the facilitation of the crimes it actually intends to prevent.  
 
In both scenarios (use in public chatrooms and direct interaction) there is a risk that the right 
to a fair trial is violated. 
 
4.7 Necessity in a democratic society 
From the above we can surmise that Sweetie brings with it the risk of privacy infringement. As 
such, it is important to determine whether or not the use of Sweetie is necessary. In other words, 
does the end (protecting children) justify the means (using an AI to engage suspects and 
potentially infringe upon their rights)?  
 
The substantial test of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is in the centre of the discussion 
when assessing whether states are allowed to interfere with individual interests in order to 
address relevant societal matters. This means that when state agencies use infringing 
investigative powers, just a reason for using the power is not sufficient, as the interference 
must be ‘necessary’.122 The ECtHR in its case law has clarified what ‘necessity means’: 
 
… the notion of necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a pressing social 
need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.123 
 
 
Proportionality is considered an essential test in relation to criminal procedure, especially when 
courts are assessing the appropriateness of governmental measures, such as secret surveillance 
operations, interception and wiretapping that interfere with the individual’s right to privacy 
and private life protected by Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 17 ICCPR.  
 
The ECtHR considers the proportionality of the measure in the light of the specific 
circumstances as a whole, and in particular whether the authorities had ‘relevant and sufficient 
reasons’ for taking the coercive measure in question.124 The process of deciding includes a 
number of factors, among others, the suspect’s interest to be protected from the interference 
with his/her rights, the severity of the infringement and the pressing social need the authorities 
seek to fulfil. The more far-reaching the interference is, the stronger the reasons required to 
                                                
122 Handyside v the UK, Application no. 5493/72.  
123 Olsson v Sweden, Application no. 10465/83.  
124 Olsson v Sweden, Application no. 10465/83.  
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justify it must be.125 The Court, however, affords states a certain margin of appreciation126 in 
choosing the means to best address the urgent needs of their society, and said margin of 
appreciation has a different scope depending on the actual circumstances and the subject 
matter. It has been held to be particularly wide in areas such as child protection.127  
 
In addition, in cases dealing with children and vulnerable groups, the ECtHR has found that 
positive state obligations can trump negative ones when it comes to securing the physical and 
moral welfare of children.128 In said scenarios, states are required to have in place effective 
criminal law provisions that would not only protect minors, but also effectively deter against 
grave acts committed towards them.129    
 
Considering the above, in order to deem the chatbot’s use necessary in a democratic society, 
the interests it seeks to protect should outweigh the interests of the potential suspects it would 
investigate. This means that the rights and interests of children who are or could potentially 
fall victim to webcam sex abuse should outbalance the interests of people who engage in a 
private chat conversation with the avatar. Furthermore, less infringing cannot yield the same 
results. 
 
The threat webcam sex tourism poses to the well-being of children is clear. Webcam sex 
sessions directly hurt the victim, and the fact that webcam streaming sessions can easily 
produce pictures or videos of the victims, causes additional harm. Furthermore, recorded abuse 
images and videos can easily lead to the subsequent distribution of child pornography, causing 
additional harm to the child.     
 
The threshold to engage in webcam sex tourism is low and the chances of getting caught are 
as of yet minimal. Perpetrators can further reduce the chances of being caught by using fake 
identities, but also various anonymisation services and hidden servers (to name just a few) to 
prevent detection. As such, the chances of identifying a suspect after the webcam sex stream 
has been concluded is likely low. The best chance of finding a suspect, is thus to catch them in 
the act. This entails luring the suspect, and subsequently interacting with them. While this can 
be done using actual law enforcement officers, the scale of the webcam sex tourism problem 
means that this ‘traditional’ way of investigation is not effective. In order to effectively combat 
webcam sex tourism, the use of scalable investigation methods such as Sweetie may therefore 
be necessary. 
 
It is important to consider that the chatbot does not indiscriminately collect all available 
information in public chatrooms, but only records communications with, and gathers data of, 
suspects who engage the avatar in a sexually charged conversations. By facilitating the 
offender’s identification, the chatbot would contribute to the effective investigation of serious 
crimes against minors, which in its turn corresponds to the ECtHR’s standards on proactively 
defending vulnerable groups by effective and deterrent criminal procedure means.     
                                                
125 Kilkelly, U 2003, A guide to the implementation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Human rights handbooks Nr. 1, p. 34 
126 Klass and others v Germany, § 48; Leander v Sweden, App no 9248/81, § 59. 
127 Kilkelly, U, p. 34.  
128 See KU v Finland, Application no. 2872/02, § 46.  
129 Ibid at § 43.  
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In line with the above, the question of prioritising the investigation of such offences by means 
of the chatbot seems necessary to successfully police public chatrooms, and other online venues 
for child sexual abuse, and fight the online abuse of children. The lasting harm experienced by 
minors in cases of sexual abuse combined with the ever-growing danger of webcam sex in 
public chatrooms tips the balance in favour of Sweetie. Minors need to be safe to freely express 
themselves on the Internet without being monitored by offenders.130 As such, we argue that 
depending on the circumstances of the case, there are strong arguments that the use of Sweetie 
is necessary in a democratic society. 
 
4.8 Legitimacy of the use of Sweetie 
Having established that Sweetie can potentially interfere with the right to privacy means that 
such an interference has to be covered by an investigative power, which requires a clear legal 
basis. None of the jurisdictions we examined have specific legal provisions that authorise and 
govern the use of Sweetie. Rather, the use of Sweetie must be ‘read’ into the existing 
investigative powers. When translating the existing investigative powers into the context of 
Sweetie, their interpretation has to match the rationale of the original provisions. A too far-
stretched interpretation would contravene the legislator’s will, but also rob the provisions of 
their foreseeability. 
 
It is dependent on the criminal procedure law provisions of the individual country whether or 
not the application of Sweetie is in accordance with the law. However, drawing inspiration 
from amongst others the Cybercrime Convention and the European Convention on Human 
Rights we can give an indication of 1) what special investigative powers could apply in relation 
to privacy, and 2) what procedural requirements must be followed in the case of entrapment. 
 
4.8.1 Privacy considerations 
As briefly discussed above, the situation in which Sweetie is merely present in a chatroom is 
not yet a substantial infringement of privacy. Incidental observation and/or recording of public 
data will likely also not yet amount to a substantial infringement of privacy. Provisions such 
as those of Art 32 (a) of the Cybercrime Convention and domestic regulations regarding the 
general tasks of law enforcement could cover this.  
 
However, if Sweetie starts systematically observing profiles and recording public chats 
(regardless of the chatroom it is present in), and particularly if she moves onwards to one-on-
one conversations, then this could amount to a substantial infringement of privacy that requires 
a specific basis in the law in many jurisdictions. 
 
Articles 16 through 19 of the Cybercrime Convention are not really applicable to the case of 
Sweetie.131 Art. 20 (the real time collection of traffic data) and Art. 21 (the real time collection 
                                                
130 Vendius, TT 2015, ‘Proactive Undercover Policing and Sexual Crimes against Children on the Internet’, p. 
18.  
  
131 The articles regulate the expedited preservation of stored computer data and traffic data, production orders and 
the search/ seizure of stored computer data respectively.   
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of content data) could be relevant in the context of Sweetie, given that Sweetie may record 
both traffic data (e.g. IP addresses) and content data (e.g. chats and files sent). 
 
One complicating factor might be the definition of communications: not all jurisdictions may 
consider a person interacting with a chatbot to constitute ‘communication’, if this is interpreted 
as exchanging of messages between persons. Whether use of Sweetie is or can be interpreted 
as recording of communications therefore may depend on the specifics of national law. 
However, since many countries also consider interacting with a machine to be communications, 
where the machine (e.g., an ATM) can be seen to serve as a proxy for a person (e.g., a bank),132 
we will consider interactions with Sweetie to constitute communications, where the chatbot 
serves as a proxy for the investigation officer putting it into operation.133  
 
The explanatory report to the Cybercrime Convention gives a broad definition of ‘interception 
and ‘technical means’ that could also cover the use of Sweetie: 
 
Interception by ‘technical means’ relates to listening to, monitoring or surveillance 
of the content of communications, to the procuring of the content of data either 
directly, through access and use of the computer system, or indirectly, through the 
use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices. Interception may also involve 
recording. Technical means includes technical devices fixed to transmission lines as 
well as devices to collect and record wireless communications. They may include the 
use of software, passwords and codes.134 
  
As such, the signatories to the Cybercrime Convention should already have in place legal 
provisions that could be applied in the context of Sweetie, at least for offences related to child 
pornography. Table 6 confirms this assumption.  
 
In the few countries not party to the Convention, however, we see a divergence in how the real-
time interception of communications is dealt with. Argentina and South Korea, for instance, 
have not developed a formal distinction between traffic and content data yet, but refer to both 
types of communication information as ‘data’. Further, these jurisdictions have not enacted 
particular legislation on real-time data collection and apply therefore the existing provisions 
on telephone wiretapping accordingly. The latter applies for Brazil and the Philippines which, 
although having introduced comprehensive legislation on cyber-investigation powers not so 
long ago, also lack provisions on real-time collection of both traffic and content data.135 Among 
                                                
132 Cf. Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 227, which identifies visiting a website to be 
communications in the context of the power of collecting traffic data, and by extension (see § 230) also of 
interception.  
133 Since interception of communications is often regarded to be one of the most intrusive investigation powers 
(see, e.g., the Cybercrime Convention), if a jurisdiction conceptualises interactions with Sweetie as non-
communicative, then presumably some other, less intrusive, investigation power may be applied to the situation.   
134 Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 54. 
135 See Mendes Saldanha, P, Substantive and procedural legislation in Brazil to combat webcam-related child 
sexual abuse (Country report on Brazil), pp. 20-21; See also Dizon, MA, Substantive and procedural legislation 
in the Philippines to combat webcam-related child sexual abuse (Country report on the Philippines), p. 31. Brazil 
applies the provisions of the Wiretapping Act accordingly, while the Philippines rest to the rules on search and 
seizure.   
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the non-signatory countries, Nigeria is the only example with explicit legislation on the 
matter.136  
 
However, as telephone interception and wiretapping practices are largely comparable to the 
interception of online communications, these countries may still meet the legality requirement, 
if the application of the respective national norms to investigative means comparable to 
Sweetie has been confirmed by the courts. Yet, in situations in which suspects engage in 
conversation with the avatar, this will likely not be (fully) covered by the norms regulating the 
interception/ management of data, but will also largely depend on the rules surrounding the use 
of undercover agents. Therefore, and for the sake of comprehensiveness, the applicability of 
the wiretapping norms mentioned above will be discussed together with the laws on undercover 
agents under section 4.8.3. 
 
4.8.2 Fair trial considerations (entrapment) 
In the following, we provide an overview of the criteria used by the investigated jurisdictions 
to draw a line between permissible luring and not-permissible entrapment. Entrapment is 
ordinarily an issue relevant in court proceedings, and as such not part of an investigative power. 
Depending on the particular system and the facts of the case, it can be pertinent in various ways 
– it can either lead to the exclusion of the obtained evidence,137 be raised as a defence and thus 
exclude guilt or liability,138 or even entirely stay the proceedings due to an abuse of process.139  
 
As indicated above, Sweetie brings about issues of both targeted and non-targeted entrapment. 
This means that in both cases certain procedural requirements must be met that have been 
established in case law. 
 
4.8.2.1 Targeted entrapment  
The compared criminal systems employ as a central consideration of whether unlawful 
entrapment has actually taken place, the reasons underlying the operation and the conduct of 
the authorities executing it. It is generally recognised that law enforcement officials are entitled 
to merely provide the suspect with an opportunity to commit the crime, but the latter should 
have been able to independently form or abandon the intention to commit it.140 The suspect 
                                                
136 S. 39 (a) of the Cybercrimes Act allows law enforcement to intercept content data and/or traffic data 
provided that the operation has been authorised by a judge. 
137 As for instance in Australia - see section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ea199580/. [23 May 2016] 
138 This is the case in the US system. See country report on the US, section 3.2.3, p. 16; In Spain entrapment is a 
judicially crafted defense, which excludes liability. See on the matter SSCS April 18, 1972 and SSCS June 22, 
1950. 
139 R v Loosely Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 2000) is considered the landmark decision in the UK 
establishing entrapment as a procedural bar; Canadian courts also make use of procedural bars, see R v Mack, 
[1988] 2 SCR 903, as well as their counterparts in Scotland - Jones v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 86, para 88.  
140 In Dutch criminal procedure this approach is known as the Tallon criterion, named after a landmark case from 
1979 (HR 4 December 1979, NJ 1980, 356 m.nt ThWvV). The case concerned drugs purchase from two 
undercover agents. The Supreme Court found that the suspect had formed his intent independently. The Belgian 
general prohibition of entrapment is embedded in Article 30 of the Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and declares criminal procedures based on entrapment inadmissible. In the UKdaniss R v Loosely 
Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 2000) the crucial question was whether the police have done more than 
present the defendant with an unexceptional opportunity to commit a crime. A criminal court would consider 
admissibility under section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).The Estonian Supreme Court has 
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should have been thus ‘allowed’ to commit the crime he/ she intended to from the very 
beginning.   
 
The ECtHR refers to this requirement as the ‘essentially passive’141 standard and examines 
whether the suspect has in any way experienced pressure by the authorities’ deceit to commit 
the crime, be it by pro-active solicitation,142 prompting or reiteration of the offer despite an 
initial refusal,143 or by making the offer very hard to refuse144. The Court also considers whether 
there were objective indications that the suspect has been involved in criminal activity or was 
predisposed to commit the crime145, and how familiar the latter is with the criminal 
environment.146  
 
This reasoning, however, is not unique to the ECtHR or European courts in general. The 
Canadian147, Australian148 and South Korean149 courts have adopted similar approaches in 
outlining entrapment, stipulating that law enforcement should not go beyond offering an 
opportunity by crossing the line and creating the offence for the purpose of prosecuting it. The 
Supreme Courts of Argentina and the Philippines150, although phrasing their entrapment tests 
in slightly different terms, also see the difference between lawful trapping and unlawful 
entrapment in the origin of the criminal intent. The legal doctrine in Nigeria appears to be 
developing in a similar direction.151 
 
The common law doctrine of the United States considers the predisposition element of the 
suspect together with the trickery, persuasion or fraud techniques performed by the law 
enforcement officers (or private persons acting on behalf of law enforcement).152 According to 
the so-called subjective approach, entrapment is committed when law enforcement has induced 
the crime and the defendant had no predisposition to engage in a criminal conduct.153 
 
                                                
established in its judgement of 2 December 2004, case number 3-1-1-110-04, para 11.3 that the authorities’ actions 
cannot be directed against persons who did not have the slightest intent of committing a crime. The Supreme 
Court of Croatia considers the persistent, long-term prompting of the suspect incitement when it turns out to be 
the decisive factor in forming the perpetrator’s will to commit the crime,  VSRH, I Kž-1255/04 of 16 February 
2006. 
141 Ramanauskas v Lithuania [GC], Application no. 74420/01, § 55. Emphasis added. 
142 Burak Hun v Turkey, Application no. 17570/04, § 44. 
143 Ramanauskas v Lithuania [GC], § 67.  
144 Malininas v Lithuania, Application no. 10071/04, § 37.  
145 Bannikova v Russia, Application no. 18757/06, § 38; Case of Constantin and Stoian v Romania, Applications 
nos. 23782/06 and 46629/06, § 55; Texeira do Castro v Portugal (44/1997/828/1034), §§ 37-38.  
146 Shannon v the United Kingdom, Application no. 67537/01.  
147 Supreme Court of Canada, R v Mack [1988] 2 SCR 903. In this particular case the Court stayed the proceedings.  
148 See R v Priest [2011] ACTSC 18 at [86] and Ridgeway v The Queen [1995] CLR 19, in which the court rejects 
a defense of entrapment.  
149 For the South Korean doctrine see for instance Supreme Court Decision, 2008DO7362, Oct 23, 2008. 
150 Araneta v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46638 [July 9, 1986]; People v Gatong-o, G.R. No. 78698 [December 
29, 1988]. 
151 See country report on Nigeria, section 3.2.3, p. 46.  
152 See country report on the US, p. 16. In the US, the defense of entrapment has no statutory basis in Federal law, 
but has been developed by the courts.  
153 Mathews v United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).  
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4.8.2.2 Non-targeted entrapment  
The case law and regulations discussed above relate to targeted entrapment, but scenarios in 
which law enforcement officials do not engage a particular suspect and operate upon a general 
suspicion need to be considered as well. The issue with said conduct is that it may be considered 
‘random virtue-testing’154 that puts the integrity of the criminal investigations at risk. Criteria 
that govern non-targeted operations must therefore be in place.  
 
The studied jurisdictions show, however, somewhat more perceptible differences in their 
approaches towards non-targeted entrapment. While in Australia, the Philippines, Poland, the 
UK and the US the fact that law enforcement targets a location or an area, but not a person, 
triggers the application of the same criteria as described above, other criminal procedure codes, 
as the one in Croatia for instance, limit the use of special investigatory tools to cases where a 
particular person has already been identified as a suspect.155 Yet, the deployment of undercover 
agents would be legally permissible under the Croatian Law on Police Duties and Powers, 
which allows location-related undercover operations provided that there are valid grounds for 
suspicion of criminal behaviour. Similarly, Canada’s doctrine also provides additional 
safeguards in this regard. Where undercover operations concern a particular place or a location, 
but not a given suspect, the authorities must reasonably suspect that criminal activities are 
occurring there. The police activity must either take place on the basis of a reasonable suspicion 
or over the course of a bona fide inquiry. In this way the doctrine ensures that no random virtue-
testing is being practiced.156 Scottish law requires state agents to obtain an authorisation before 
executing an operation when the suspects are not identified.157   
 
Yet other approaches focus on the ordinariness of the law enforcement behaviour. Following 
the Tallon criterion158 in the Dutch procedural context, non-targeted entrapment would be 
allowed if the lure does not substantially change the original situation or location in which it is 
employed, so that it cannot exert any significant impact or influence on the decision-making 
process of the suspect.159 The Belgian Court of Cassation handles non-targeted entrapment in 
a similar manner. The decisive criterion in their view is that the luring procedure imitates or 
portrays a daily life scene without exaggeration.160 
 
4.8.2.3 Fair trial requirements applied to Sweetie 
Considering the substantive entrapment tests outlined under section 4.8.2, Sweetie’s conduct 
must remain essentially passive to avoid investigative impropriety. Further, once the suspect 
has been engaged in a conversation, the chat script should also leave room for the suspect to 
retreat. If the avatar does not proactively solicit potential suspects, but waits to be approached, 
and avoids pressure or any inducement to steer the conversation in a particular, sexually 
                                                
154 Bronitt, S 2004, ‘The law in undercover policing: A comparative study of entrapment and covert interviewing 
in Australia, Canada and Europe’, p. 37.   
155 See Art. 332 (1) and Art. 334 of the Criminal Procedure Act of Croatia.  
156 See Supreme Court of Canada, R v Mack [1988] 2 SCR 903, paras 113, 119.  
157 See country report on Scotland, p. 21.  
158 Ibid at fn. 140.   
159 These contemplations originate from two important cases of the Dutch Supreme Coourt, HR 28 oktober 2008, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BE9817 (Lokfiets-arrest) and HR 6 oktober 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI7084 (Lokauto-
arrest). In both cases bait was set by law enforcement without suspicion of a specific person.  
160 Cass. 17 maart 2010, AR P100010F; Brussel 14 maart 2007, RABG 2008, afl. 1, 63, note L. Delbrouck.  
 60 
charged, direction, it would act beyond legal reproach. It appears that an exception to this test 
can only be made within the US framework, where courts are likely to close an eye on a more 
provocative behaviour, if the suspect has a demonstrable predisposition towards child abuse 
offences.161 
   
Further, with regard to the location of the undercover operation, that is to say when it targets 
an area (presently a chatroom) and not a particular suspect, it is relevant that the use of the 
chatbot does not significantly alter the existing circumstances. This, of course, would be largely 
dependent on the targeted chatroom.  
 
If Sweetie is used in a regular chatroom for users under the age of 18, and her profile resembles 
that of the majority of minors there, her online presence would abide by this rule, if it does not 
make itself more visible than the mere entering a chatroom with a common-looking chat name. 
In addition, for some of the jurisdictions described above,162 law enforcement agencies would 
need to substantiate their initial suspicion or get a particular authorisation from an independent 
body to proceed with a non-targeted operation in a chatroom. Disregarding these criteria would 
likely compromise the admissibility of the gathered evidence or of the investigation as a whole.  
 
If, however, Sweetie enters an ‘above 18’ chatroom, already her logging-in is likely to 
significantly alter the situation. In such cases, the particular assessment of the avatar’s 
placement will depend among others on the number of real children present there. While there 
might be indeed some room to employ the chatbot in online areas intended as ‘adults only’-
fora, but demonstrably being used for the webcam prostitution of real children, Sweetie’s 
appearance in a regular adult chatroom would likely constitute non-targeted entrapment.  
 
An additional question arises in relation to recurring offenders (persons returning to the same 
chatroom and repeatedly engaging the avatar in a sexually charged conversation) and whether 
a different entrapment test (or a suspicion threshold for that matter) should apply to them, since 
the chatbot would be ‘re-encountering’ them. However, as of the writing of this report, there is 
no information that such situations are being handled differently. It appears that the rules on 
non-targeted entrapment are applicable in such cases as well, especially since the avatar’s 
presence in the chatroom would not aim to engage offenders with whom the chatbot has already 
communicated, but potentially everyone who has an interest in an illegal webcam interaction 
with a child.  
 
It is, however, doubtful whether we can adequately assess Sweetie’s entrapment implications 
at all, since the entrapment tests discussed above have their origin in police operations, which 
are substantially different from online investigations of sexual exploitation. This in its turn is 
closely connected to the question of Sweetie’s authorisation as an investigation tool, which will 
be discussed shortly.   
 
Although some entrapment tests refer to the situation of placing an opportunity for potential 
suspects in ‘hotspot’ areas, said techniques merely stage a (conventional) subject in an 
everyday environment (a car, a bike or even a person in a park that however does not interact), 
                                                
161 See US country report, p. 18.  
162 See the references made under section 4.8.2.2 of this report.  
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which does not require further police intervention until the suspect takes the bait. Sweetie, 
however, seems to exceed this mandate, as it will undeniably interact with the suspect. As such, 
Sweetie resembles more an undercover agent, and its interactive capacity would fall under the 
authority of more comprehensive undercover operations, which typically involve pseudo-
purchases of illegal goods (the so-called buy and bust approach), the infiltration of a criminal 
environment or both at the same time. In these scenarios undercover agents are allowed to act 
as offenders or to be in direct contact with offenders, and thereby to actively take part in the 
crime (if national law allows such operations, e.g., for drugs investigations).   
 
Yet, these controlled operations start from preconditions that differ from Sweetie. Sweetie does 
not act as an offender, but as an ‘interacting’ child victim. Accordingly, the rules on undercover 
operations in which police act under a false identity while posing as a victim would apply. 
Here, considering the chatbot’s mandate to tackle webcam child sex tourism on a global level, 
it is pertinent to establish whether there is any international legislation that can guide 
undercover agents in such operations.   
 
In the European context especially, the EU has long proactively sought to find a solution to 
streamlining particular undercover techniques, including the use of undercover agents and their 
operational capacities.163 The European Investigation Order (EIO)164 reflects said objective, 
and Art. 29 stipulates: 
 
An EIO may be issued for the purpose of requesting the executing State to assist the 
issuing State in the conduct of investigations into crime by officers acting under 
covert or false identity (‘covert investigations’). 
 
However, the article also clearly establishes that covert investigations should take place ‘in 
accordance with the national law and procedures of the Member State on the territory of which 
the covert investigation takes place’.165 In other words, the use of undercover agents remains a 
strictly national matter.  
In terms of other international instruments on undercover agents, at the time of writing this 
report, no binding guidelines exist. Further authorisation is thus to be sought in the country 
specific norms on investigative powers.  
 
4.8.3 Overview of country-specific rules in relation to privacy and entrapment 
In Argentina, the undercover agent figure is codified under Law 24424 (the so-called Drugs 
Law), but is explicitly recognised only for operations investigating the trafficking or smuggling 
of narcotics.166 In addition, there is no general regulation on undercover operations online, or 
surveillance for that matter,167 so it appears that investigations concerning online activities 
resort to the rules on obtaining physical evidence and apply them in analogy. Having said that, 
                                                
163 See Vendius, TT 2015, ‘Proactive Undercover Policing and Sexual Crimes against Children on the Internet’, 
p. 20.  
164 Parliament and Council Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters. 
165 See Art. 29 Directive 2014/41/EU.  
166 See Argentinian report, p. 23.  
167 Ibid, pp. 23-27.  
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and considering that under current Argentinian law an inappropriate interaction with Sweetie 
can only be dealt with under the figure of impossible attempt (which as explained above 
appears to have no clear assessment criteria),168 finding a legal basis for the avatar’s use seems 
challenging.    
 
The findings of the Australian report indicate that there are no obvious impediments to 
Sweetie’s investigatory use. The country’s regulations on covert policing169 have been mainly 
developed to oversee covert operations, in which officers would perform otherwise unlawful 
acts, such as the delivery of narcotics. Covert online investigations of child grooming (in 
contrast to infiltration of online child pornography rings) usually do not require the police to 
resort to these mechanisms,170 and no court has ruled on whether it is improper to conduct such 
investigations without the use of a controlled operation or assumed identity authority in the 
absence of otherwise unlawful conduct. Following this premise, Sweetie can be used both as a 
lure and an undercover agent that gathers information. The evidence gathering features of the 
chatbot would be qualified as a surveillance device.  
 
In Belgium, there are possible avenues for using the chatbot following an evolutionary 
interpretation of the provisions on infiltration and wiretap operations.171 These, however, are 
not applicable to investigations concerning the offences of cyber-luring and cyber-grooming, 
which are excluded from the list of offences triggering said investigative powers. Accordingly, 
law enforcement will have to rely on offences like cyberstalking (Art. 145, § 3bis Act 
Regarding Electronic Communications) to obtain the necessary authorisation.  
 
Brazilian criminal procedures on the interception of communications, the collection of traffic 
data and other similar investigation techniques require a court authorisation as well.172 While 
it appears that said means have been used in the course of operation ‘Darknet’, known for 
successfully bringing child pornography offenders to justice, the details of the investigation are 
still sealed.173 It is therefore difficult to find examples of their application in an online 
environment. In addition, while the law on infiltration operations174 can also be taken into 
consideration as authorisation for Sweetie’s recording of webcam streams and chat logs, 
employing Sweetie as bait is considered illegal. Further, as a crime against an avatar cannot be 
prosecuted in Brazil, there is no legal basis for its investigation either.  
 
S.184(2)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code, that applies to both wiretapping and undercover 
operations, regulates the interception of communications where one party consents to 
recording. Depending on the interpretation of the provision, consent could be reasonably 
established by Sweetie’s operators / the Canadian police. Should that not be the case, a judicial 
authorisation would be necessary for every instance of Sweetie’s interaction with a potential 
                                                
168 See section 3.4.2 of this report.  
169 See the Crimes Act 1912 (Cth), available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca191482/. [9 
August 2016].  
170 R v Priest [2011] ACTSC 18 (11 February 2011) at [90]. See also country report on Australia, p. 24.  
171 Belgian report, section 3.4, p. 37. 
172 See Brazilian country report, p. 25.  
173 Ibid, section 3.4, p. 26.  
174 Law n.º 12.850/2013, Art. n.º 3º, IV, V and VII, and Arts. 10 – 17. Available at: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12850.htm. [9 September 2016].  
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suspect pursuant to s.184(2)(b) CCC. As for the overall regulation of undercover operations in 
Canada, these are subject to the provisions on statutory police powers, whose foundation 
appear to be common law principles and the existing extensive case law on undercover 
policing.175 Following their rationale, the legality of Sweetie’s use as an undercover agent 
appears to be quite plausible.  
 
The Croatian Criminal Procedure Act contains provisions on the use of undercover 
investigators and informants, simulated sale and purchase of items, and simulated bribe-giving 
and business services,176 but it makes no explicit reference to the use of software or 
technologies for investigative purposes.177 Yet, given that the law on special investigatory 
procedures allows operations in which undercover investigators set fake profiles on social 
networks and other Internet fora in order to communicate with potential perpetrators, the use 
of Sweetie for the same purpose appears possible.178  
 
Under English law, the rules on undercover police operation, surveillance and on the 
interception of content and communications data have been tested in cases where officers 
would pose as children online, and it appears that said rules provide a sufficient legal basis for 
Sweetie. Interestingly, under those provisions, since one part of the communication is known 
(presently Sweetie), exchanging messages between the avatar and the alleged offender would 
not amount to interception.179  
 
The laws on undercover surveillance activities carried out by police agents cover luring and 
interacting with a suspect in Estonia.180 Yet, the provisions explicitly refer to a ‘police agent’, 
implying the involvement of a human being. This is problematic given that the rules at hand 
are quite recent, meaning that the laws have been consciously enacted without consideration 
of virtual undercover agents or other AI technological means, and there is no case law (yet) 
that would advocate a different interpretation.   
 
Since under Israeli procedural law no provision explicitly authorises law enforcement to 
employ undercover agents, but police operations make use of such means nevertheless, 
according to the country report it does not matter whether said unauthorised power is executed 
in the context of offline or online investigations; nor does it matter whether the police use a 
human or a computer agent. Therefore, investigation powers in Israel can be applied to 
Sweetie.181 
 
Given that under Dutch law many of the investigatory powers are formulated in a technology-
neutral manner, they are applicable to the online context as well.182 Sweetie’s use could fall 
under article 126g DCCP and 126j DCCP, which regulate systematic observations and the 
                                                
175 Said operations are limited by constitutional guarantees and controlled (where necessary) by judicial oversight.   
176 Art 332 (1) point 5, 6 ,7 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Official Gazette no. 152/08, 76/09, 80/11, 121/11, 
91/12, 143/12, 56/13, 145/13, 152/14. 
177 However, the law does not exclude them either.  
178 See the findings of the Croatian country report, section 3.4, p. 32.  
179 See report on England and Wales, p. 47.  
180 See section 3.3.2.2.2 of the Estonian report.  
181 See Israeli report, p. 16.  
182 Country report on the Netherlands, section 3.3, p. 24.  
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method of systematically gathering intelligence online respectively.183 Further, the 
investigative method stipulated in article 126m DCCP may also be used in the context of 
Sweetie, for instance, to record the webcam stream, or the associated chats.  
 
The Nigerian rules that regulate the interception of communications upon a judicial 
authorization (online observation and electronic infiltration embedded in sections 39 and 39 
(b) of the Cybercrimes Act respectively) seem to refer to technological means such as the 
installation of software or a device, but not to artificial intelligence agents. The conduct of 
undercover agents is also not explicitly regulated.184 Therefore, there appears to be no explicit 
legal basis for using Sweetie in Nigeria.185 
 
Under Philippine law, while there seems to be some legal basis for the use of Sweetie as a 
lure,186 other investigation practices, such as the search, seizure, preservation and production 
of computer systems and data, are principally only applicable to cases involving real children. 
Exceptions can be considered with regard to the few crimes directly applicable to Sweetie, 
which as indicated above are grooming, luring, cybersex, and attempted cybersex. Short of this, 
there will be no legal basis for law enforcement to search, intercept or collect data from or 
about suspected sex offenders, since the latter would not be involved in the commission of any 
crime.187 
 
The avatar’s use in Poland can be submitted for one part of the process under article 19a and 
19b of the Police Act, which regulate controlled operations or the so-called ‘police 
provocation’188. These would govern the avatar’s interaction with and luring of the suspect, 
and cover, for instance, the receipt of material containing child pornography. The collection of 
information could then fall under article 19 and 20 of the Police Act. They regulate, on the one 
hand, the collection of the communication’s content and its preservation, including webcam 
footage and other computer data, and the obtaining and processing of personal information on 
the suspect, on the other.189 Yet, article 19a and 19b usually authorise operations where a 
suspect has already been identified, and not to the other way around, which markedly reduces 
the situations in which Sweetie can be legally used.  
 
Provided that law enforcement obtains the necessary authorisation for undercover operations, 
Sweetie appears to be usable under Scots law.190 
 
                                                
183 These provisions cannot be applied upon a general suspicion. In Sweetie’s case, their application would depend 
on the particular circumstances of the case and on how law enforcement substantiates their conduct.  
184 See Nigerian report, p. 44.  
185 See Nigerian report, section 3.4, p. 48. 
186 The findings in the country report on the Philippines indicate that there are no specific laws on undercover 
policing and operations. Such activities are subject to general laws (i.e. the rights and protections granted under 
the Philippine Constitution) and the relevant case law on entrapment. See on the matter section 3.2.3 of the country 
report.  
187 See country report on the Philippines, p. 36.  
188 See country report on Poland, section 3.4, p. 35.  
189 Both provisions implement a three-step safeguarding system, which requires the approval of the high-rank 
police officers, the prosecutor and the district court. See for more information the Polish report, p. 35. 
190 See country report on Scotland, p. 21.  
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In Spain, Sweetie’s use will only be possible under article 282bis of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, which codifies the figure of the so-called cyber-undercover agent. This refers to a police 
officer who acts under a false identity in an online setting. The provision allows the agent’s 
interaction with a suspect and the recording of the communication, provided that the necessary 
authorisations have been obtained.191 However, since under Spanish substantive criminal law 
a crime against Sweetie cannot be committed and an attempt is not punishable, the chatbot 
could only be employed as a form of intercepting device against already identified suspects.     
 
In Turkey, article 139 of the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the appointment of undercover 
agents, while the interception, recording and evaluation of electronic signals transmitted 
through telecommunication channels are embedded as a method of investigation in article. 135 
(1) of the same statute.192 However, undercover agents may only be used to investigate the 
crimes listed exhaustively in article 139 (7), which does not include the crimes against the 
sexual integrity embodied in articles 102-105 or articles. 226-227 of the Turkish Penal Code.193 
In a similar manner, data interception and recording powers are only applicable to article 103 
and article 102 (1) of the Penal Code (sexual exploitation of children and sexual assault 
respectively), the former of which requires physical contact between the offender and the 
victim, while the latter refers to an adult victim. Considering the above, Sweetie would have 
no legal basis under the current criminal law framework in Turkey.   
 
The US procedural system allows the recording of private one-on-one chat communications, 
given that Sweetie could be considered a party to the conversation.194 As to its authorisation as 
a lure or an undercover agent, it is likely that courts will simply consider Sweetie a way to 
automate undercover operations, and the rules that apply to the chatbot are those that regulate 
undercover operations.195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
191 See Spanish report, p. 34.  
192 See country report on Turkey, section 3.4, p. 30.  
193 See country report on Turkey, section 3.2.3, p. 27. 
194 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). However, the law speaks of a ‘person’ and not of an 
AI agent. It appears that the provisions could be applied to Sweetie if the avatar is seen as a proxy of the law 
enforcement officer supervising its communication with the suspect. See the country report on the US, section 
3.4.1, p. 21.  
195 The rules covering undercover operations have no specific statutory basis, and as a result have been developed 
by the courts. 
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Table 7: Applicability of existing investigative powers to Sweetie 
 Explicit laws on AI-
investigatory tools  
Laws on special 
investigatory powers 
Application of the 
laws to AIs such as 
Sweetie 
Argentina - X - 
Australia - X X 
Belgium - X X (for some crimes) 
Brazil - X - 
Canada - X X 
Croatia - X X (no case law yet) 
England and Wales - X X 
Estonia - X - 
Israel  - X196 X 
Netherlands - X - 
Nigeria - X - 
Philippines - X X (for a few crimes 
only) 
Poland - X X (if suspect 
identified)197 
Scotland - X X (possibly) 
South Korea - X X (possible if Sweetie is 
not considered a 
coercive measure) 
Spain  - X - 
Turkey - X - 
USA - X X 
 
4.8.4 Reasonable suspicion 
The previous subsection showed that in about half of the investigated jurisdictions, as of the 
writing of this report, the chatbot cannot be employed because there is an insufficient legal 
basis. Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter on substantive criminal law, the use of Sweetie 
may be blocked because having a sexually charged interaction with a virtual minor is not 
considered criminal. For the latter category, a rationale for using Sweetie nonetheless could be 
that interacting with Sweetie may give law enforcement reasonable suspicion/ probable cause 
that someone is guilty of a(nother) crime, enabling law enforcement to employ other 
investigative techniques, such as searching a suspects’ home.  
 
In these instances, the gathered evidence cannot be used to prosecute the suspect for crimes 
against a digital character, but the information could yield a reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause that the person in question may have committed another relevant crime, be it webcam-
facilitated abuse of real children, or the possession, creation, or accessing of child pornography.  
 
                                                
196 As indicated above Israel’s practice is not based on case-law or statutory laws, but on the exercise of unwritten 
powers.  
197 This interpretation of the Polish Police Act still has to be confirmed by the courts.  
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If the chat, for instance, clearly shows that the person has experience in discussing webcam sex 
with children, then that might be sufficient for assuming he has likely committed a webcam 
sex crime before. In a similar vein, if the person sends to the avatar child pornographic material 
in order to corrupt or groom it, this would be a strong indication that the suspect is indeed in 
possession of such material. These indications would then trigger investigation procedures 
coupled with the prevention/ investigation of sexual crimes against real minors, which would 
be guided by the already existing and regulated investigation means.  
 
For the legality of the above approach, the use of Sweetie must be allowed in some shape or 
form in domestic criminal procedure law. Furthermore, the possibility of taking this road will 
inevitably depend on the particularities of the criminal system, and on the interpretation of the 
standards of reasonable suspicion198 and probable cause199, which is a ‘value judgement’200. In 
Turkey, for instance, an official investigation can already be triggered by ‘simple suspicion’,201 
while coercive powers such as search or seizure of computer devices can only be set in motion 
upon ‘strong grounds of suspicion’202. The Nigerian Penal Code in its turn speaks of 
‘reasonable grounds’ when it comes to authorising intrusive investigation procedures in 
relation to serious crimes.203 We found similar formulations in most of the investigated 
jurisdictions.  
 
However, it is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the exact scope of these standards and 
how they would apply to information obtained through the use of Sweetie. At this point it 
suffices to have drawn the reader’s attention to the matter.  
 
4.9 Summary and conclusions 
Based on the legislation and case law discussed above, we conclude that there are still serious 
legal impediments to (widely) employ the methodology of Sweetie in about half of the studied 
countries (see Table 7 above). This is mainly due to the absence of a clear legal basis. 
 
The necessity for a specific legal basis stems directly from Sweetie’s intrusive nature as an 
investigation tool that interferes with fundamental rights. However, we found that none of the 
jurisdictions at hand has enacted legislation that would explicitly consider artificial intelligence 
software systems as a means of investigation. Some jurisdictions compensate this lack of 
provisions with the analogous or direct application of other investigatory powers, while in other 
jurisdictions the existing investigatory powers appear insufficient to allow such an approach.  
 
The inability to use existing investigative powers has in large parts to do with Sweetie’s hybrid 
nature, combining a variety of investigatory methods that interfere with privacy (by 
                                                
198 In the US, for instance, reasonable suspicion is considered less than probable cause both in quality and quantity, 
but courts have failed to provide further guidelines. See Alabama v White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990). 
199 Probable cause is considered by some an ‘articulable belief that a search will more likely than not produce 
significant evidence of wrongdoing’, see Slobogin, C 2012, ‘Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a 
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory’, pp. 12-22. 
200 Taslitz, AE 2013, ‘Cybersurveillance without Restraint: The Meaning and Social Value of the Probable Cause 
and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to Third-Party Electronic Records’, p. 887.   
201 See country report on Turkey, p. 19.  
202 See Art. 134 of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Law.  
203 See Country report on Nigeria.  
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intercepting communications and recording them) and fair trial rights (considering its capacity 
to actively participate in said communications by interacting with suspects and potentially 
entrapping them). In several countries, the investigated jurisdictions have legislation in place 
to authorise the first conduct, but not the second, and are therefore incapable of 
comprehensively implementing Sweetie.  This is the case in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Spain 
and Turkey. These countries would have to enact particular legislation to fulfil the criteria laid 
down in international and national legislation on fundamental rights. On the one hand, these 
countries do not criminalise the (attempted) abuse of virtual characters, and therefore the 
conduct does not warrant use of investigation powers. On the other, undercover operations are 
either not covered by the law at all, or only with regard to a short list of offences, excluding 
crimes against the sexual integrity or other offences that could be potentially relevant in the 
context of webcam child sex tourism. It remains to be seen whether these insufficiencies can 
be circumvented by interpreting the information delivered by Sweetie as a reasonable 
suspicion/ probable cause to authorise investigative measures.  
 
As for the rest of the studied countries, Sweetie’s application in investigations is likely to fit 
the legality standards only in regard to the coercive powers authorising it in the first place. 
While said application scope seems rather limited in Belgium, the Philippines and Poland, 
which focus on particular online offences, the chatbot and its features appear to satisfy the 
constitutional requirements in Australia, Canada, Croatia and England and Wales. These 
countries have developed substantive and procedural means to tackle the online abuse of 
children. Especially, the enactment of laws against the online grooming of children has 
prompted a perceivable shift in the investigation techniques as well, allowing for more 
proactive policing of online communications and for applying existing tenets on entrapment 
techniques to undercover investigations when targeting an area and not a particular suspect.  
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5 Digital Forensics 
 
Undercover operations that would use Sweetie to apprehend webcam child sex offenders 
require not only a legal framework that authorises such an investigation tool. As the chatbot is 
primarily intended to facilitate the identification of perpetrators, it brings about questions on 
the evidentiary rules applicable to the collection of evidence from the chat communications 
and webcam streams. Therefore, in the following subsections we elaborate upon the general 
requirements applicable to (digital) evidence and how the countries in this study implement 
these.  
 
5.1 Generally accepted standards  
Criminal investigations aim to follow the trail that offenders leave while committing the crime 
and to link suspects to the crime.204 The information gathered with this purpose, i.e. the 
evidence of the crime, has to be preserved and examined in a particular manner to maintain the 
objectivity called for by the investigative process,205 and to be introduced in court accordingly. 
While this is a general tenet from traditional forensic disciplines, it applies to online 
investigations and digital evidence as well, and means that the cyber-trail is to be rigorously 
followed. In this regard, progress has been made by law enforcement in the digital evidence 
gathering, be it by furthering the expertise of police officers in handling technology or by 
involving IT experts who oversee or perform the information gathering themselves. By now, 
courts are also used to dealing with digital evidence and deem it admissible, provided that its 
authenticity and integrity are ensured.   
 
5.1.1 Authentication and chain of custody 
The authentication of evidence ensures that the obtained information is the same as the 
originally seized. One of its most important objectives is maintaining and recording the chain 
of custody, which requires that each person who handles the evidence including the handling 
itself must be documented, and may be summoned to testify on the originality of the evidence 
in court.206 An improper chain of custody may result in the contamination or loss of evidence. 
The chain of custody requirements apply likewise in the context of digital evidence.    
 
5.1.2 Evidence integrity and digital fingerprints   
Integrity checks further support the authentication process by ensuring that the evidence has 
not been altered since the time of its collection. In digital forensics, this is usually done by a 
comparison of the digital fingerprint of the evidence at the time of collection with the digital 
fingerprint of the evidence in its current state.207  
 
5.2 Implementation of digital forensics in the compared jurisdictions 
When dealing with the standards of digital forensics, we observed that all of the jurisdictions 
at hand admit electronic evidence in court. While some, following specific incentives 
introduced by the Cybercrime Convention, have already enacted particular legislation, others 
                                                
204 Casey, E 2011 ‘Foundations of Digital Forensics’ in E Casey (ed), Digital Evidence and Computer Crime, p. 
16.  
205 Casey, E 2011 ‘Foundations of Digital Forensics’ in E Casey (ed), p. 19.  
206 Casey, E 2011 ‘Foundations of Digital Forensics’ in E Casey (ed), p. 21. 
207 Casey, E 2011 ‘Foundations of Digital Forensics’ in E Casey (ed), p. 22.  
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still lack provisions on the technical requirements and expertise that need to be met when 
gathering digital evidence.208 In the case of the latter, the law deals with electronic evidence in 
the same way as with any other type of evidence. Although this means that the general rules 
on the authentication and integrity of evidence are observed, the fact that no formal 
technological standards exist may compromise the gathered information.  
 
Many have adopted diverging approaches. In Australia, evidence from electronic sources is 
routinely adduced through the questioning of qualified expert witnesses, such as the particular 
analyst who conducted the forensic examination.209 Also in the Polish law enforcement 
practice, the expert witness report would likely be the piece of key evidence.210 In Estonia, the 
role of the expert witness is prescribed by the Forensic Examination Act, which states that 
‘information technology examinations’ regarding materials in relation to the sexual abuse of 
minors should be performed by the Estonian Forensic Science Institute’.211 
 
Yet other countries foresee a more active role of law enforcement officers in the handling of 
digital evidence and supplement their functions with additional technological tools. In Spain, 
while expert opinions will still be indispensable to identify the true origin of a 
communication212 in a troublesome case, Art. 588ter f) of the Criminal Procedure Act ensures 
the integrity of the digital information by introducing electronic signatures that affirm the 
origin and destination of the communication.213 Similarly, shortly after the introduction of 
electronic signatures214 by Provisional Measure (MP) 2.200/ 2001215, the Brazilian legal system 
has adopted notarial minutes216 as a supportive evidential standard. While said minutes are 
regulated under the Code of Civil Procedure, the criminal system recognizes them as 
appropriate for the purpose of criminal proceedings.217 Put together with electronic files or 
digital documents, the notarial minutes support the credibility of any content taken from the 
web. However, notarial minutes apply to publicly available content only. 
 
In the US, when it comes to online chat conversations officers are generally encouraged to use 
a screenshot or a browser’s saving function to limit their interference with the content.218 
 
                                                
208 This is true for Belgium (see country report on Belgium, p. 44), Canada (country report, p. 53), Croatia (country 
report, p. 34), Israel (country report, p. 16), Nigeria (see country report, p. 50), the Philippines (country report, 
p.37), and Scotland (country report, p. 21). 
209 See country report on Australia, p. 26.  
210 See country report on Poland, p. 36.  
211 Regulation on the list of examinations conducted in EFSI, subsection 5(3)(1). Available from: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13365049. [28 September 2016]. 
212 Judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice 300/2015 delivered on 19 May.  
213 Spanish report, p. 40.  
214 This is a digital certificate issued by the Brazilian Public Infrastructure Key (ICP-Brazil), which awards 
electronic files a presumption of veracity. For more on the matter see country report on Brazil, p. 24.  
215 In the Brazilian legal system provisional measures have a temporary validity and are issued by the President 
of the Republic in urgent situations. See https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/bra/en_bra-int-des-ordrjur.html. 
Provisional Measure (MP) 2.200/ 2001 is available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/mpv/Antigas_2001/2200-2.htm. [14 September 2016].   
216 Regulated in Article 384 of the CPC. Notarial minutes enhance the credibility of images, audios, videos and 
writings taken from web pages that could have been easily amended or deleted.  
217 See Brazilian report, p. 27.  
218 See United States v Jackson, 488 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Neb. 2007). 
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5.3 Storing data from online chats and chatroom activity 
Given that webcam streams, unlike downloads, are not by default stored on the personal 
computer of the victim or the suspect, the criminal systems that lack provisions concerning 
content interception of online communications may experience practical issues to prove illegal 
webcam sex, as witness statements or seized electronic devices may not be available.  
 
However, it is possible to gather other forms of evidence related to the webcam streams, such 
as for instance chat logs that have been saved. When Sweetie is used by law enforcement, then 
streams can also be recorded. Investigation agents can further take screenshots, when deemed 
necessary. Such records would be crucial to make the evidence available in court.  
 
In addition, the chat scripts of the avatar should also be added to the other relevant information 
for the consideration of the judges before sentencing. This way the court would be able to gain 
an insight into how the avatar has approached the communication and whether any impropriety 
could be witnessed on the part of the AI agent, for instance, whether it complied with the 
‘essentially passive’ standard required to avoid entrapment.  
 
5.4 Summary and conclusion 
While the investigated jurisdictions do follow the generally accepted forensic standards such 
as observing the chain of custody and taking precautions to maintain the integrity of the 
evidence, only some of them have taken particular steps towards the implementation of digital 
forensics agendas. Therefore, the available lessons from the practice vary and law enforcement 
agencies (would likely) approach the collection of evidence from chat communications and 
webcam streams differently. The lack of uniformity bears risks for the comprehensiveness of 
future investigations of webcam crimes (against minors), and may present challenges for the 
handling of the gathered information and for its sharing in trans-border operations.   
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6 Jurisdictional concerns with the application of Sweetie 
 
As indicated in chapter 3,219 depending on the exact conduct of the suspect and how he would 
approach Sweetie during the chat conversation, there are some avenues for prosecuting him for 
soliciting (or attempting to have) webcam sex. However, as webcam child sex tourism crosses 
national borders and implies scenarios in which, as a rule, victim and offender reside in 
different countries, jurisdictional conflicts inevitably present themselves. 
 
The latter can be best illustrated by means of the following example. Let us assume for the sake 
of the study that UK law enforcement authorities use Sweetie to conduct a luring operation in 
a public chatroom for users under 18 years. Through Sweetie’s solicitation by suspects and its 
communication with the latter, they manage to collect enough information such as IP addresses 
and Skype handles to identify a number of individuals, some of which reside in Australia and 
Spain. The computer devices of those alleged offenders and (parts of) the potential evidence of 
their interactions with Sweetie would be stored beyond the physical reach of the UK officials, 
which means the latter will have to resort to remote transnational information searches. In so 
doing they would primarily face two legal difficulties: what legal grounds would entitle them 
to start an investigation, and under what circumstances can the investigation be conducted (also 
abroad)?  
 
The first question is closely connected to the states’ jurisdictional capacity to prescribe rules, 
but also with our finding that the different actions of the offender in front of the webcam or as 
a part of a chat conversation with Sweetie trigger different norms under domestic law. The 
second issue on how to enforce investigative procedures in relation to offences against Sweetie 
has to do both with the available coercive powers discussed in chapter 4, and with the general 
jurisdictional tenets on enforcing state laws. Therefore, to answer these questions and explain 
what the likely outcome of our example would be in practice, in the following sections we 
apply the international law rules on state jurisdiction to trans-border cyber-investigations, and 
subsequently to the case of Sweetie.   
 
6.1 Grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction in cybercrime investigations   
Across frontiers, powers are differently distributed and restricted, and it is international law 
that governs the legal framework of interaction. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the state’s 
operation of coercive powers abroad is subject to strict international limitations. Said 
operational limitations are inherent in the rules of state sovereignty, which in their turn have 
effected a differentiation between a state’s power to regulate or otherwise impact people, 
property and circumstances220 (usually referred to as prescriptive jurisdiction), and its ability 
to enforce it (enforcement jurisdiction).  
 
Both these competences, although originating from the same notion, have an impact of their 
own in the criminal context at hand, and are conditioned upon a certain link to the state willing 
to assert them.  
 
                                                
219 See table 4: Criminalisation of (attempted) webcam sex with Sweetie.  
220 Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, p. 469.  
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6.1.1 Prescriptive jurisdiction   
States’ jurisdictional claim to prescribe law can be premised on a number of factors.221 The 
state’s direct proximity to the crime scene has enhanced the traditional idea that a crime is best 
punished locally.222 The principle of territoriality is, therefore, one of the main grounds for the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, and gives states the right to exercise it regardless of the 
offender’s nationality.223 However, the territoriality principle is more comprehensive than one 
assumes it to be at first glance, as it applies also to crimes committed only partially on the 
territory of a state.224 This is the case where, for instance, the criminal conduct has been 
initiated in one state, but completed in another.225 Under such circumstances, both states would 
have criminal jurisdiction to try the perpetrator – the first under the principle of subjective 
territoriality, the second one under the objective territoriality principle.  
 
Further, the principle of nationality, the state’s special link to its population, allows a state to 
domestically regulate the conduct of its nationals wherever they are. Therefore, states are also 
entitled to claim jurisdiction over offences committed by their nationals abroad,226 and can do 
so even if the suspect has a dual nationality.227 Often, countries opt for additional statutes that 
regulate precisely which offences trigger jurisdiction over nationals abroad.228  
 
In addition, a state can seek to regulate conduct under the passive personality principle and the 
protective principle.229 The former, a disputed practice, allows states to exercise jurisdiction 
over anyone who harms their nationals. The latter justifies regulating conduct that produces 
harmful effects within a state’s territory and thus endangers national (security or economic) 
interests. The ‘effects’ theory is widely accepted in the international community and often used 
in treaties.230  
 
Since technology-specific rules on state jurisdiction do not exist, the exercise of jurisdiction 
over cybercrimes remains largely based on the approaches outlined above, among which the 
principle of territoriality plays the most pivotal role. Although this may appear odd when 
dealing with criminal behaviour portrayed in the ‘de-territorialised’231 space of the Internet, 
international law so far has imposed very few limitations on states when they claim criminal 
jurisdiction over cybercrimes, and relies on their willingness to resolve positive jurisdictional 
clashes by rather informal means.  
                                                
221 Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, p. 474; Klabbers, J 2013, International Law, p. 91.  
222 August, R 2002, ‘International Cyber-Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis’, p. 534.   
223 Gillespie, AA 2012, ‘Jurisdictional issues concerning online child pornography’, p. 153.   
224 Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, p. 475.  
225 The classical example explaining such a situation is where a person shoots at someone across a border and kills 
them in the neighbouring state.  
226 Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, pp. 479 ff.   
227 Harris, D 2010, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 230.  
228 This is often the case in common law countries. See on this issue Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, p. 481.  
229 A further possible base for the assertion of state jurisdiction – the universality principle – will not be discussed 
here. Although webcam sex crimes against children are a highly serious matter, they do not form part of the group 
of war crimes and crimes against peace or humanity that trigger universal jurisdiction due to the particular danger 
their represent for the international community as a whole. See on this Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, pp. 
485ff. 
230 See for instance the 1979 Hostages Convention, the Aircraft Hijacking Conventions and the 1994 Safety of 
UN and Associated Personnel Convention.    
231 Ryngaert, C 2015, Jurisdiction in International Law, section 3.5.  
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6.1.2 Jurisdiction to enforce 
Enforcement jurisdiction is another matter. Although a state may have jurisdiction to prescribe 
rules that even portray a certain extraterritorial reach, it generally cannot enforce said laws 
(whether by judicial or executive organs) outside its territory without the affected state’s 
consent. As states are independent from each other and possess territorial sovereignty, the 
capacity of a state to operate within the borders of another state is essentially restricted by the 
sovereign powers of the latter. Translating this into the criminal context means that although a 
state may claim criminal jurisdiction based on rules enacted according to its prescriptive 
jurisdiction, law enforcement usually sees itself constrained to finding evidence and 
apprehending the alleged offender within their own territory, or acquiring these from other 
states’ territory through mutual legal assistance.  
 
6.1.2.1 Extra-territorial application of investigative power 
The observations made above mean that trans-border investigations are not allowed unless 
expressly consented by the host state232 or established by an international agreement. The same 
applies to investigative techniques conducted in cyberspace such as remote information 
searches that aim, for instance, at accessing and securing information from a server located 
abroad. Opposing opinions that advocate a different understanding when investigators do not 
physically enter the other state’s territory233 are not tenable under the current state of 
international law. While admittedly this is not so much a question of substantively threatening 
the territorial integrity of the state hosting the data, such practices interfere with the state’s 
sovereign control over its citizens and their rights as it subjects them to foreign legislation and 
law enforcement. The state sovereignty breach may therefore easily result in a breach of the 
laws on criminal procedure and the corresponding procedural guarantees.  
 
Therefore, in the event of unauthorised remote investigations, some of the countries studied for 
the purposes of this report render criminal procedures against a national inadmissible if the 
procedure has been based on evidence obtained by entrapping the suspect, or the use of other 
coercive techniques by foreign police agents.234 However, in some of the criminal systems such 
information may also be considered a reasonable suspicion that triggers investigative 
procedures on the national level.235  
 
Yet some other criminal systems at hand are willing to take into account evidence that has been 
brought about by the investigative powers of foreign agencies that may have trespassed their 
enforcement powers and thus violated the territorial sovereignty of other states. In the 
Netherlands for instance, the Schutznorm principle allows the use of such evidential material 
if Dutch authorities have not been involved in acquiring the data.236 A further interpretation of 
                                                
232 Shaw, MN 2014, International Law, p. 473.  
233 Johnson, DR and Post, D 1996, ‘Law and borders: The rise of law in cyberspace’, pp.1367-1402; See also 
United States v Gorshkov, No CR00-500C (W D Wash May 23, 2001), where the US claimed that they did not 
violate Russian sovereignty because the FBI agents never left US soil.   
234 That is the case to a certain extent in Belgium. See Belgian report, p. 35.  
235 This is for instance the case in Argentina, see country report on Argentina, p. 27.  
236 Rb. Alkmaar 19 February 2004, LJNA05509, case no. 14.060137-02, to be found at http://www.rechtspraak.nl; 
Rb. Groningen 16 October 2003, LJNAM1882, case no. 18/076010-01, published in 2003 Vakstudienieuws, 56.4 
and at http://www.rechtspraak.nl. See also Hock, AA and Luchtman, MJ 2005, ‘Transnational cooperation in 
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the same principle allows for the use of the evidential information if the foreign agency ends 
up obtaining the information on the individual without actually targeting him, but its own 
nationals.237  
 
In any event, the exercise of investigative powers outside of national borders and its 
consequences would depend on the jurisdiction(s) involved and the case in question. For the 
purposes of this study it suffices to have highlighted that it interferes with the targeted state’s 
sovereign competence to govern its population, and with individuals’ privacy and due process 
rights.  
 
6.1.2.2 Mutual legal assistance 
States typically address the gap between their capacity to regulate and to enforce by relying on 
mechanisms for legal assistance, which are usually referred to as treaties on mutual legal 
assistance or MLATs. There are countless multilateral and bilateral agreements between states 
that establish procedures for obtaining and providing assistance in transnational criminal 
matters.238 Normally, a request for assistance, for instance, to locate or to arrest a person, to 
produce documents or records, or to perform a search, can only be denied on the grounds 
specified in the respective treaty. 
 
Further, it is important to note that MLATs are rather context-specific or offence-specific, and 
may therefore never cover the entire range of circumstances leading to a particular 
investigation. That is to say, if the requested procedure or coercive power is not explicitly 
covered by an agreement, a request for assistance will be (formally) devoid of any prospects 
from the very beginning. The same applies if the alleged criminal conduct is not listed in the 
agreement. Any further steps of the investigation would then lie with the good will of the 
agencies across the border.   
 
Where MLATs do not exist the investigation authorities employ informal means of 
cooperation. These tend to be even more difficult to use, as they may involve multiple states 
with varying legal systems, and therefore different understandings as of what constitutes a 
criminal offence. If one of the states involved has not criminalised the alleged conduct under 
its national law, the requirement of double criminality239 cannot be fulfilled. Said state will 
likely have no interest in contributing to the investigation.    
6.2 Translating the jurisdictional rules to the context of Sweetie  
Let us now apply the jurisdictional tenets described in the preceding sections to the case of 
Sweetie. Since prescriptive jurisdiction can be claimed on a number of grounds, it means that 
                                                
criminal matters and the safeguarding of human rights’, p. 4. The Israeli system also suggests that evidence against 
nationals obtained by foreign agents in an unauthorized trans-border operation would be admissible.  
237 Ibid at fn. 209.  
238 Bellia, PL 2001, ‘Chasing bits across borders’ in University of Chicago Legal Forum, p. 50. See for instance 
Commonwealth of Independent States Agreement, Art. 5; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 23; 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement, Art. 3-5. Art. 28 (2) of the AU Convention on Cyber Security 
and Personal Data Protection, EX.CL/846(XXV), Malabo, 27th June 2014. 
239 The principle of double criminality was introduced by extradition treaties and requires the act to which a request 
relates to be a crime under  both  the criminal law of the requested state and the requesting state. For a 
comprehensive discussion on this see Williams, SA 1991, ‘The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A 
Comparative Analysis’, p. 582.   
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also in our example several states will be able to do so over crimes against Sweetie, as the 
Internet amplifies the existing options. The initial act’s location (presently Australia or Spain, 
from where the alleged child offenders have accessed the chatroom) or where it has its effect 
(Sweetie’s location), as well as the location of the chatroom servers or other hardware (which 
may be in any country around the globe) can establish a sufficient link to a country to claim 
jurisdiction; there are states that even use the location of anything remotely connected to the 
crime to claim jurisdiction.240 Thus, although it is the UK that has initiated the investigation in 
question, it may be difficult to establish who has the stronger jurisdictional claim. 
  
The enforcement side of the question brings about additional challenges. As remote 
information searches are ‘not distinguishable in legally relevant ways’241 from physical 
searches, directly pursuing the digital trail of the webcam offenders would mean to engage with 
the territorial sovereignty of Australia or Spain, or any other state that could potentially harbour 
(parts of) the searched data. Consequently, in order to obtain computer data physically located 
on Australian or Spanish territory, UK’s law enforcement must either obtain the consent of the 
state authorities to continue the search or resort to traditional procedures of mutual legal 
assistance.  
 
6.2.1 Mutual Legal Assistance in the case of Sweetie   
UK law enforcement may be able to resort to an existing MLAT on cybercrime. Surveys, 
however, show that cybercrime MLATs tend to focus on matters of extradition rather than on 
evidentiary procedures.242 Thus, there is a chance the requested investigative act would not be 
explicitly covered by the respective treaty, which as explained above would lead law 
enforcement to resort to informal means of cooperation.  
 
In the context of webcam child sex tourism the lack of a concrete MLAT is not unproblematic, 
since, as described in the third chapter of this study243, states tend to criminalise webcam sexual 
abuse through different legal constructions. While the offender’s conduct in the UK may fall 
under the offence of attempted child prostitution, the same conduct against Sweetie would fall 
in Australia under the crime description of attempted sexual abuse or grooming, whereas in 
Spain an inappropriate interaction with Sweetie would not be criminal at all. This would hinder 
the establishment of double criminality, which is essential for triggering investigative 
procedures abroad.  
 
In addition, electronic evidence may simply be lost after a short period of time. This is critical 
considering the fact that legal assistance mechanisms require time to be set in motion. The time 
needed to issue a request and to eventually execute it on the other side of the border usually 
costs the authorities their opportunity to secure volatile electronic evidence.244 In the case at 
hand this consideration is of particular importance given that webcam streams produce mainly 
volatile data that can be lost completely once the suspect has powered down his computer.  
                                                
240 See, for instance, the cybercrime jurisdiction provision of Malaysia, Art. 9 Malaysia Computer Crimes Act 
1997. More on that in Brenner, SW & Koops, BJ 2004, ‘Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction’, pp. 21-23.  
241 Bellia, PL 2001, ‘Chasing bits across borders’ in University of Chicago Legal Forum, p. 62.   
242 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, p. 200.  
243 Compare table 4: Criminalisation of (attempted) webcam sex with Sweetie.  
244 Current reports indicate that responding to a request can actually be a matter of months. For more on this: 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013, Comprehensive study on cybercrime, pp. 197ff.   
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6.2.2 The Cybercrime Convention  
Against the background of the challenges of standard MLATs and their potential interplay with 
Sweetie’s case outlined above, a legal instrument that deserves our attention is the Cybercrime 
Convention. This tackles some of the shortcomings that result from out-dated and lengthy MLA 
procedures.  
 
The Convention establishes mandatory contact points (24/7 networks) between national 
agencies, which are meant to ensure the immediate assistance in investigation matters.245 The 
treaty further addresses consent and procedural difficulties between national agencies by 
streamlining investigation procedures and defining four methods for securing computer data, 
namely expedited preservation of stored computer data, expedited disclosure of preserved 
traffic data, real time collection of traffic data, and interception of content data.246 In this 
context, signatory parties are obliged to confer said competences to their national authorities 
so the latter can both obtain and request the disclosure of data. However, the Convention, which 
can also be acceded by non-Council of Europe states and has therefore gained in importance 
globally, leaves jurisdictional clashes unresolved, as it does not provide guidance, or sets up 
mechanisms, for prioritising competing jurisdiction claims.247  
 
Moreover, although this approach and the procedures it introduces clearly go far beyond 
ordinary mutual assistance mechanisms,248 they are still confined within the borders of the state 
where the data is physically located. The Convention thus does not bring about new approaches 
for dealing with trans-border investigations, but largely relies on traditionally known and well-
recognised jurisdictional concepts. The power to search, seize, or intercept digital evidence 
remains in the hands of the host state, and transnational investigations are not welcomed under 
the Convention’s provisions.249 The only exception is article 32, which allows cross-border 
access to publicly available data (which is not very relevant in the case of Sweetie, except 
perhaps for securing data from publicly accessible chatrooms),250 as well as cross-border access 
to data with voluntary consent from someone who has the lawful authority to consent.251 That 
will usually be the foreign state, although it may also include service providers (e.g., chatroom 
providers) if data protection and contract law allow them to consent to law enforcement 
accessing the data at issue (which is unlikely to be the case in our example). Efforts to draft an 
additional protocol to the Convention on trans-border access to data have not been successful 
and seem on hold at the moment; it will likely take a long time before countries will be ready 
to agree on some international agreement on trans-border access to data.252 
 
                                                
245 See Art. 35 CCC.  
246 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Arts. 29-31, 34.  
247 See Art. 22 (5) CCC. The provision merely stipulates that states should be the one to determine ‘the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution’, but a further elaboration upon this ‘appropriateness test’ is missing.  
248 Bellia, PL 2001, ‘Chasing bits across borders’ in University of Chicago Legal Forum, p. 59.  
249 The Convention’s provisions stipulate clearly that the respective procedural rules are applicable only within a 
state’s territory. See Art. 18, 19, 20, 21 CCC, which explicitly refer to national territory.  
250 See Art. 32 (a) CCC.  
251 See Art. 32 (b) CCC. 
252 See, extensively, Koops, BJ and Goodwin, M 2014, Cyberspace, the cloud, and cross-border investigation: 
The limits of international law. 
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Thus, although all three countries from our example have signed and ratified the Convention, 
the UK law enforcement officials have to reach out to their counterparts in Australia and Spain 
to formally request the securing of the data needed for an investigation of an offence against 
Sweetie.  
  
6.3 Conclusion  
By highlighting the existing tension between, on the one hand, a global communications 
network where webcam child sex tourism can take place across borders, and, on the other, law 
enforcement procedures that remain tightly restricted to national territory, this chapter has 
called attention to the problematic nature of the enforcement of criminal law. Law enforcement, 
but more relevantly regulators and policy-makers, should be aware of the jurisdictional 
challenges in the context of Sweetie. We conclude that as states and their law enforcement 
agencies continue to move within a consent-based legal framework, a more effective way of 
cross-border investigation is necessary. In the case of Sweetie, the lack of international 
harmonisation makes itself especially felt, because of the divergence of criminal provisions 
and instruments,253 which affect the scope of and possibilities for international cooperation.   
 
With regard to webcam child sex offenders, law enforcement agents will have to rely on the 
willingness and expedited proceedings on the part of their foreign colleagues when further 
investigating a suspect’s digital trail. Be it following the Cybercrime Convention’s standards 
or MLAT procedures, when it comes to securing digital evidence,254 the agent’s law 
enforcement powers end at their respective national borders. As with other forms of 
cybercrime, this fact may significantly undermine the effectiveness of investigations against 
suspects using Sweetie. 
 
 
  
                                                
253 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013, Comprehensive study on cybercrime, p. 208.  
254 Koops, BJ and Goodwin, M 2014, Cyberspace, the cloud, and cross-border investigation: The limits of 
international law, p. 14. 
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7 Effective and legitimate use of Sweetie: the way forward 
 
In the following we discuss the main substantive, procedural and jurisdictional issues in 
Sweetie’s implementation identified in the present report, and possible ways to address these.  
 
7.1 Legal uncertainties and restrictions for the use of Sweetie 
 
7.1.1 Substantive law restrictions 
Based on our research we have identified several issues that need to be remedied in order to 
effectively and legitimately combat webcam sex using Sweetie. This would in most cases entail 
changes to substantive criminal law. Whether or not countries want to actually adapt their 
substantive criminal law in order to facilitate the use of Sweetie is a question of a political 
nature.    
 
1) Clarifying substantive law  
In most jurisdictions under examination we see that webcam sex with minors is criminalised 
in one form or another. However, given that in most jurisdictions this relatively new form of 
crime is ‘read’ into existing crime descriptions there are questions regarding the extent to which 
this behaviour is criminalised. 
 
In order to avoid stretched legal interpretations that might be at odds with the principles of 
legality and legal certainty, it is recommended that legislators include in their crime catalogues 
(more) explicit definitions of ambiguous terms such as ‘pornographic’ and ‘sexual activity/ 
abuse’ and more guidance on what kinds of behaviours associated with webcam sex fall within 
which crime descriptions. 
 
Changing substantive criminal law in order to facilitate the use of Sweetie 
Sweetie is first and foremost an innovative investigation tool. Its innovativeness entails that in 
order for it to be used legitimately, changes to substantial criminal law will most likely need to 
be made. As it stands, several jurisdictions may not deem interacting with Sweetie in a sexually 
charged way a criminal offence at all. In these jurisdictions it will be hard to justify the 
application of Sweetie by law enforcement, because the behaviour Sweetie elicits and exposes 
is actually not criminal at all.  
 
If these jurisdictions wish to allow the use of Sweetie by law enforcement, it stands to reason 
that they change their substantive criminal law systems in such a way that the intention of the 
suspect is the determining factor in establishing criminal liability. This will mean a shift from 
an ‘act based’ criminal law system towards a more ‘intention based’ criminal law system. 
Whether combating child sex abuse using Sweetie necessitates such a shift in the approach to 
criminal law is a matter of ethics and politics.  
 
Jurisdictions that already criminalise virtual child pornography and/or the grooming of virtual 
characters, or those considering criminalising these acts (such as for instance the Netherlands 
in the case of grooming), should also consider including subjective elements in provisions that 
relate to child (webcam) sex abuse. An inconsistency in the approach to criminalisation of child 
 80 
(webcam) sex abuse may create normative gaps, so from a legal-systematic viewpoint it makes 
sense to extend criminal liability to related offences. 
 
International harmonisation 
Last, but not least, it is recommended to discuss a global approach to dealing with child 
webcam sex tourism using tools such as Sweetie, in order to avoid crime and penalty havens 
and to create more legal certainty. If consensus is reached, this must be reflected in international 
legal instruments such as the Lanzarote Convention and the OPSC. International investigations 
and mutual legal assistance procedures would benefit from domestic systems that criminalise 
webcam child sex exploitation in similar terms and through similar crime descriptions. 
 
7.1.2 Procedural law restrictions  
In terms of criminal procedure, we have found that the jurisdictions at hand have all introduced 
coercive investigative powers to address serious and organised crime. While a fair number of 
these investigative powers may also be applied in an online context, most of them are still 
‘traditional’. That is to say, they were written in large parts for the ‘offline world’ and do not 
readily accommodate the use of innovative investigative tools such as Sweetie. 
 
A particular issue when it comes to the application of Sweetie is its ‘hybrid’ nature as a lure, 
an apparatus for recording conversations and video and an intelligent undercover agent. If law 
enforcement wants to use Sweetie, it is important to determine whether existing investigative 
powers used either alone or in conjunction, cover the application of Sweetie. Given the possible 
infringement of privacy, both in cases where the use of Sweetie is covered by existing 
investigative powers and in cases where new legislation is introduced, the application of 
Sweetie must be in accordance with the law. That is to say the laws governing the use of 
Sweetie must be accessible and of sufficient quality.   
 
With regards to the issue of entrapment, it is relevant that the application of Sweetie follows 
existing guidelines on targeted and non-targeted entrapment. Law enforcement should 
carefully consider in which chatrooms Sweetie is placed and how she will interact with suspects 
via her chat script. Particular attention needs to be devoted to the hybrid character of Sweetie 
as a lure and as an undercover agent. In more traditional settings these investigative functions 
are not combined. In this sense the existing use of human lures (e.g. law enforcement officers 
posing as minors in a chatroom) is instructive. 
 
If the use of Sweetie necessitates changes to criminal procedure law, it is also relevant to 
include explicit standards in the handling of digital evidence.  
 
7.1.3 Adressing jurisdictional constraints 
A way to possibly avoid more complex jurisdictional questions and competing jurisdictional 
claims (as outlined in the preceding chapter) would be to primarily use Sweetie to investigate 
nationals or residents of the respective country. This can be done by focusing on local 
chatrooms (intended for and frequented by national users), which would lessen the difficulties 
of obtaining the necessary authorization for using coercive powers, and of physically securing 
and investigating the devices used by offenders if needed. This task could be further facilitated 
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if following the examples set by Australia, Canada and the UK on the matter, states legislate 
the criminality of a country's citizens' committing crimes against children extra-territorially. 
 
A possible way to facilitate cooperation and to alleviate jurisdictional conflicts in relation to 
trans-border investigations of webcam child sex tourism and other child exploitation offences 
would be to adopt an Optional Protocol (OP) to the Lanzarote Convention on the matter. 
 
OPs have the advantage of introducing additional provisions, procedures and mechanisms to 
the original treaty by maintaining the latter’s scope and integrity. Human rights treaties for 
instance, oftentimes provide in their OPs for complaint procedures that address alleged human 
rights abuses, or regulate substantive law areas not considered previously. States have no 
obligation to ratify those protocols, but can do so if they think that said instruments enhance 
their national interests or broader policy and international cooperation agendas.      
 
An OP to the Lanzarote convention that regulates cross-border investigations would have 
following advantages:  
 
- It could provide guidance on how to deal with positive jurisdictional conflicts in 
relation to trans-border investigations of (Internet) child sex/ abuse offences only, 
thereby avoiding broader commitments which are not likely to be accepted by sovereign 
states;  
 
- The OP would bindingly stipulate the forensic standards required for handling data 
searches and the resulting evidence, prompting states that have not yet introduced 
digital agendas to do so, and preventing the loss of digital evidence due to improper 
handling. 
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8 Summary and conclusion 
 
Webcam sex tourism, the act of engaging children in webcam prostitution, is a growing 
international problem. Not only does webcam sex tourism provide easy access to child abuse 
and child abuse images for child abusers, it also a crime that has a comparatively low risk for 
the offenders. Live webcam performances leave few traces and little evidence that law 
enforcement can use. Further difficulties arise from the fact that webcam sex tourism often has 
a cross-border character, which causes jurisdictional conflicts and makes it more difficult to 
obtain evidence or even launch an investigation. 
 
The Dutch children’s rights organization Terre des Hommes (TdH) was the first NGO to 
actively tackle webcam child sex tourism by using a virtual character called ‘Sweetie’ to 
identify offenders in chatrooms and online forums. An agent of the organisation operated the 
Sweetie avatar, posing as a ten-year old Filipino girl, in order to gather information on 
individuals who contacted Sweetie and solicited webcam sex. The gathered information was 
subsequently handed over to the authorities, who thereupon were able to launch investigations 
in various countries.255  
 
One of the major drawbacks of Sweetie 1.0 (and law enforcement in general) is that the avatar 
could not be deployed at scale. Human operators can only engage in a limited number of 
conversations with suspects, while the (potential) solicitations addressed at Sweetie 1.0 far 
exceed that number. Sweetie 2.0 aims to solve this problem. Sweetie 2.0, being an artificial 
intelligence, is far more scalable because multiple instances of Sweetie can be deployed 
simultaneously.  
 
But using an artificial intelligence like Sweetie raises serious legal questions. Sweetie as an 
investigative tool is so innovative, that it is unclear whether its use is actually covered by the 
existing rules of criminal procedure. However, the question of criminal procedural legality of 
Sweetie is preceded by a prior substantive criminal law question: is interacting with Sweetie in 
a sexually charged way a criminal offence in the first place, given that Sweetie is not a person, 
but a virtual avatar? An answer to this question is important, because if webcam sex tourism 
with a virtual avatar is not considered criminal, it will be much harder to make the case that 
Sweetie is an acceptable investigative method. 
 
We will discuss the substantive criminal law issues and the criminal procedure law issues 
separately below. 
 
8.1 Substantive criminal law issues 
In our research we have identified the following issues that impact the application of 
substantive criminal law: 
 
                                                
255 Further information on the project known as ‘Sweetie 1.0’ can be found on 
www.terredeshommes.nl/en/sweetie-face-webcam-child-sex-tourism. [28 September 2016].  
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1. Sweetie is not an actual person and as such sexually charged interactions with Sweetie 
may not be considered criminal in jurisdictions criminalising only certain interactions 
with real persons (e.g. the Netherlands).  
2. Sweetie is deliberately programmed not to perform sexual acts or to show sexual 
organs. 
 
In most of the jurisdictions we examined webcam sex with real minors has been criminalised 
in one form or another (see table 3), however the same cannot be said for webcam sex with a 
virtual person such as Sweetie (see table 4).   
 
In some jurisdictions someone can never be convicted for committing or attempting to commit 
an offence against Sweetie (e.g. Brazil and the Netherlands). In other jurisdictions, criminal 
liability is only limited to the specific offence of grooming (e.g. Argentina and Belgium), which 
is in many cases not applicable to Sweetie. For most jurisdictions however, it is quite uncertain 
given an absence of case law (and even literature) on the matter (e.g. Germany, Israel, Poland). 
 
In most jurisdictions the crime descriptions applicable to webcam sex tourism contain a 
specific mention of ‘a person under the age of X years’. Given the fact that Sweetie is not a 
real person, this element of the crime can never be proven. Furthermore, because Sweetie is 
not programmed to undress, perform sexual acts or show sexual organs, many crime 
descriptions such as those related to sexual performances or child pornography, cannot be 
fulfilled.  
 
Although the crime descriptions related to webcam sex tourism in most jurisdictions can never 
be fulfilled, there might be room to qualify the behaviour of the suspect as an attempt. In this 
regard, the doctrine of the inadequate attempt (legal or factual impossibility) is relevant, as it 
will determine whether an attempt is punishable or not.  
 
When we speak of a legal impossibility, the behaviour, even if completed never leads to a 
criminal offence, regardless of the criminal intentions of the suspect. The reason for this is that 
in these cases the behaviour on display itself is not criminal. This can either be the case because 
the means are absolutely inadequate (e.g. trying to shoot someone by pointing a banana at 
them), or because the object at which the act is aimed is absolutely inadequate (e.g. trying to 
murder a corpse). 
 
With a factual impossibility a suspect’s intended behaviour would constitute a crime, but the 
suspect fails to complete the crime, because of a circumstance unknown or beyond his or her 
control. In these cases the inadequacy of the means or the object are relative. An example of a 
relatively inadequate means would be an unloaded pistol used to try and shoot a person. An 
example of a relatively inadequate object is an empty cash register in which someone puts his 
hand to grab money. Under normal circumstances this would have resulted in the theft of 
money, but in this concrete case, the attempt fails. In contrast to a legal impossibility, a factual 
impossibility is punishable.  
 
In the case of Sweetie, the question is whether we should regard Sweetie as an absolutely 
inadequate object or a relatively inadequate object. Looking solely at the behaviour in relation 
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to the crime description, we may argue that Sweetie is an absolutely inadequate object: the 
crime of webcam sex with a minor can never be completed, because Sweetie is not, nor ever 
will be a real minor. The fact that Sweetie cannot show sexual organs or display sexual 
activities, further adds to the argument for an absolutely inadequate object. 
 
However, we can also take a somewhat broader perspective and qualify Sweetie as a relatively 
inadequate object for the crime of webcam sex with minors. The argument would be that the 
suspect wants to commit the crime of webcam sex with a minor, but is ‘unlucky’ and picks 
Sweetie rather than a real minor. This case is comparable to the example of the cash register: 
under normal circumstances the crime would have been committed, but due to ‘bad luck’ on 
the part of the suspect, there is now a factual impossibility. 
 
There is merit to both arguments and when we look at the jurisdictions we have examined, we 
see that they take different approaches. For instance, there are jurisdictions (such as the 
Netherlands), that take an objective approach and look at the actual act and thus lean towards 
legal impossibility, and systems that take a more subjective approach, attaching more weight 
to the intention of the suspect, leaning more towards factual impossibility. 
 
In particular, countries that come from a common law tradition seem to take a more subjective 
approach, either in statutory law itself, or in case law (e.g. Australia, Canada, the UK and the 
US). In these jurisdictions the subjective element of the crime (i.e. the intention of the suspect) 
plays a more important role than the objective act. If the suspect is under the (false) impression 
that he/she is communicating with a minor, this is the determining factor for criminal liability. 
 
So as it stands, approaches to criminalising webcam sex tourism vary throughout the world and 
in many jurisdictions it is still uncertain whether an attempt at webcam sex tourism can be 
construed at all. Only in those countries that take the intent of the suspect as the determining 
factor in criminal liability can Sweetie 2.0 be clearly employed as an investigative tool. 
 
For those countries where it is impossible or substantially uncertain to find a crime description 
that can be used to criminalise webcam sex tourism with a virtual minor, legislative changes 
are needed in order to enable the use of Sweetie. The choice to move further away from an 
‘act-based’ criminal law system towards a more ‘intention-based’ criminal legal system in 
order to combat webcam sex tourism is of a fundamental nature and would require careful 
ethical and political deliberation. 
 
Finally, from the perspective of law enforcement it may be worthwhile to explore if Sweetie 
can be used to investigate the crime of webcam sex with a real person, or related crimes. While 
the interaction with Sweetie may not be considered criminal in itself, it could provide a 
reasonable suspicion that someone is or has been involved in webcam sex tourism with real 
minors, which would then provide the legal basis for further investigating the suspect using 
other, more traditional investigative methods. The legitimacy of such an approach is very much 
dependent on the circumstances of the case and the criminal procedure law of the individual 
jurisdiction and would also require careful deliberation.  
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8.2 Criminal procedure law issues 
If the use of Sweetie is possible in light of substantive criminal law, its application will also 
raise criminal procedure law questions. We have identified these two main questions: 
 
1) Is the use of Sweetie in accordance with the law? 
2) Does Sweetie respect fair trial principles in the pre-trial phase, more specifically the 
rules on entrapment? 
 
Use of Sweetie in accordance with the law 
Sweetie is an innovative investigation tool that actually combines three distinct investigative 
functions into one package, namely: 1) a lure (comparable to for instance a bait car), 2) an 
(undercover) agent that can engage in conversation with a suspect, 3) a device that can record 
information such as conversations, pictures and videos. The hybrid nature of Sweetie raises 
questions whether its application is in accordance with the law. We have established that 
Sweetie can infringe on the privacy of the suspect. As such, in most if not all of the jurisdictions 
under examination, criminal procedure law that provide procedural safeguards must govern the 
use of Sweetie.  
 
In order for Sweetie to be applied legitimately, there must a legal basis that is sufficiently 
accessible and foreseeable. This means that either a specific legal basis for the use of Sweetie 
must be established in the law of criminal procedure (which is not the case in the jurisdictions 
examined), or its use must be covered by existing investigative powers and practices such as 
those on systematic observation, undercover work and the recording of confidential 
information and communication. As can be judged from table 7, in about half of the 
jurisdictions we examined, the use of Sweetie is not covered by existing legislation or it is not 
sufficiently clear that it is. The reasons for this are that 1) the investigative techniques employed 
by Sweetie may not be used for crimes related to webcam sex tourism, 2) the use of Sweetie 
clearly does not fit the existing powers, or 3) the existing powers might be usable, but there is 
no legal precedent.  
 
Clearer rules on the application of Sweetie for investigative purposes will serve both the 
interest of legal certainty and those of effective law enforcement. By providing more clarity on 
the legal status of Sweetie, either through legislation, or by testing its legality in court, the 
proper balance can be found between protecting children and the rights of potential suspects. 
  
Entrapment 
Sweetie can be used for the non-targeted and targeted luring of suspects. Basically, the use of 
Sweetie starts out in a non-targeted form (i.e. Sweetie is a passive ‘lure’ in a chatroom) and 
moves to a targeted form (once Sweetie is solicited, she interacts directly with the suspect). 
Whether these forms of engaging with suspects are legitimate is dependent on the 
circumstances of the case. Using article 6 ECHR (fair trial) as a point of departure, we have 
examined the legality of Sweetie from this perspective. 
 
When it comes to non-targeted entrapment it is important that Sweetie does not alter the 
existing circumstances (i.e. the chatroom and public chat) in such a way that it provides an 
opportunity to potential perpetrators that would not have otherwise presented itself. 
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Furthermore, depending on the jurisdiction law enforcement must substantiate that area is a 
crime hotspot and/or that they have a reasonable suspicion that the crime under investigation 
is taking place in that area. 
 
When it comes to targeted entrapment it is important that Sweetie does not incite or entice the 
suspect to commit acts that were not already his/her intention. More specifically the chat script 
of Sweetie must –amongst others- adhere to the following rules: 1) Sweetie may not propose 
webcam sex herself, or steer the suspect in that direction, 2) Sweetie may not appeal to the 
suspect’s conscience (e.g. telling the suspect she is a poor kid and needs the money), 3) if a 
suspect backs down, she may not re-engage the suspect.  
 
8.3 Jurisdiction 
Since webcam sex tourism is a global phenomenon, cross-border investigations are part and 
parcel of combating webcam sex tourism. This inevitably leads to jurisdictional issues. When 
it comes to prescriptive jurisdiction, we mainly see a difference between the examined 
jurisdictions in terms of criminalisation. The global fight against webcam sex tourism would 
benefit from more harmonisation of substantive criminal law. On the whole though, we do not 
expect significant issues with prescriptive jurisdiction in terms of crime and penalty havens nor 
susbstantial issues surrounding double criminality and mutual legal assistance. 
 
When it comes to enforcement jurisdictions the issues are potentially bigger. We have found 
that there are significant differences in terms of the regulation of investigative powers 
throughout the different jurisdictions. In particular, the rules on the use of undercover agents 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This might lead to issues when Sweetie is used extra-
territorially, for instance, using Sweetie from the United States in order to catch Dutch webcam 
sex offenders. Addressing the issue of enforcement jurisdiction and the (unilateral) extra-
territorial application of enforcement powers is no small matter. It is therefore more practical 
to use Sweetie mainly in a domestic context. In other words, using Sweetie only to catch 
national subjects, not foreigners. Another option is to use the existing mutual legal assistance 
procedures and to hand over investigations to local law enforcement of suspects’ countries. 
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